



**2026
ULSACMUN**

**HANDBOOK FOR
DELEGATES**



**HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(CRISIS & GAMIFICATION COMMITTEE)**

Contents

1. Message from the Secretary General
2. Message from the Chair
3. Purposes and Principles of the United Nations
4. About the Historical Security Council
5. Unique topic: The Cold War (1947-1991)
6. Questionnaire
7. Summoned delegations
8. References
9. Rules of procedure
10. Rules addendum: Gamification system
11. About the Working Papers
12. About the Resolution projects
13. Preambulatory and operative phrases
14. Schedule of ULSACMUN 2026

1. Message from the Secretary General

Dear Delegates, Board Members and Staff, Advisors, and Press,

It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to the 2026 edition of ULSACMUN, taking place on May 11, 12, and 13. As members of the General Secretariat, it is an honor to accompany you all throughout these three days in this meaningful experience for the entire community.

This Model United Nations was organized with the vision of empowering young people to actively participate in generating meaningful change in our society. We firmly believe that, through values such as service, justice, solidarity, equality, respect, commitment, and diplomacy, we can build a better environment for all—a more just and equitable one—and above all, one where all ideas are considered to build humane and sustainable foundations, ultimately leading to a better world.

Likewise, ULSACMUN 2026 features new committees designed to spark delegates' interest in historical, current, and fictional topics. Throughout the three days of the model, you will participate in these committees with enthusiasm and a commitment to resolving any challenges that may arise. We thank you for your participation and for choosing this model to enrich your experience as MUN members. We hope you leave proud of having participated and been part of this edition. The responsibility each of you carries is to change the world and understand it from many perspectives. We encourage you to give your all in this edition and, most importantly, enjoy the wonderful ULSACMUN experience.

Once again, thank you for your participation and for being part of ULSACMUN 2026.

Indivisa Manent, we remain united.



Ramón Hurtado Calzada
Secretary General of ULSACMUN 2026



Luis Mario Pinkus Ramírez
Secretary General of ULSACMUN 2026

2. Message from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

On behalf of the entire Chair, we sincerely thank you for choosing our committee. By doing so, you have decided to be part of a distinctive and dynamic experience designed to truly challenge you.

This will not be a conventional committee. Here, you will not only put your debating skills to the test, but also your strategic thinking, leadership, and ingenuity. Representing a country in the context of the Cold War requires far more than defending an international position: you will need to navigate internal pressures, political interests, and decisions capable of shaping the course of history.

We will incorporate elements of strategy, negotiation, and espionage to create a more immersive and realistic simulation. Our objective is not to intimidate, but to ensure that you fully experience the intensity and depth of high-level diplomacy. We want this committee to be challenging, yes — but also engaging, dynamic, and, above all, memorable.

Thank you for placing your trust in this space. We are confident that by the end of this experience, you will not only have debated, but also strengthened your skills, expanded your strategic vision, and elevated your leadership to the next level.


Welcome to the Historical Security Council and to ULSACMUN 2026!



David Toirac Caraballo
Moderator



José Eduardo Wismann Saad
President



Emilio Castro Sánchez
Conference Officer

3. Purposes and Principles of the United Nations

Taken from Chapter I of the United Nations Charter:

Article 1: The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2: The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1 shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter

4. About the Historical Security Council

4.1 Historical background: The United Nations Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the UN, with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It is composed of 15 members: five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms. The permanent members hold veto power over any substantive resolution, and the Council's authority includes imposing sanctions and authorizing the use of force. The United Nations Security Council was established in 1945 as part of the United Nations, with its first meeting taking place on January 17, 1946. Its purpose was to prevent future wars and maintain international peace and security after the failures of the League of Nations and the devastation of World War II.

4.2. Purposes and functions of the Security Council: The primary purpose of the Security Council is to safeguard international peace and security. It is responsible for determining the existence of threats to peace, recommending methods for peaceful dispute resolution, imposing sanctions, and, when necessary, authorizing military action to restore stability. The Council's functions include maintaining international peace and security, investigating disputes, recommending peaceful settlement methods, and taking enforcement measures such as sanctions or military action. In addition, it establishes UN peacekeeping operations, recommends new members to the General Assembly, appoints the Secretary-General, and elects judges to the International Court of Justice. During the Cold War, however, the Security Council's effectiveness was often hampered by the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The frequent use of the veto by both powers led to deadlock, limiting the Council's ability to act. As a result, its role was often reduced to investigating disputes, recommending peaceful settlements, and, in rare cases, imposing sanctions or authorizing force, while the General Assembly had to assume a more active role in addressing global crises.

4.3 Structure of the Historical Security Council: The Security Council is composed of fifteen Member States. It includes five Permanent Members: China, France, Russia, the United

Kingdom, and the United States; all of which hold veto power, and ten Non-Permanent Members elected by the United Nations General Assembly for two-year terms.

The Presidency of the Security Council rotates monthly among its members in alphabetical order. In a Model United Nations setting, the committee is directed by the Chair, who oversees debate, enforces the rules of procedure, and ensures the orderly conduct of sessions. Each member has one vote. To adopt a resolution, at least nine affirmative votes are required, with no veto from any Permanent Member.

5. Unique topic: Cold War (1947–1991)

5.1 Linked SDG's



5.2 Abstract: The Cold War (1947–1991) was a prolonged geopolitical confrontation between the capitalist United States and the communist Soviet Union, a rivalry that reshaped global politics, economics, and culture for nearly half a century. Rooted in incompatible visions of governance, development, and security, this confrontation never escalated into direct full-scale conflict between the two superpowers—largely because of the spectre of nuclear retaliation—but it played out across multiple arenas: proxy wars, covert operations, intelligence competition, economic programs, and battles for cultural influence.

Institutionally and militarily, the divide produced competing blocs and security architectures, from the western alliance NATO to the Soviet-aligned Warsaw Pact and the

broader Eastern Bloc. Key crises—the Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War—tested deterrence, alliance cohesion, and crisis management. The ideological struggle extended into science and symbols: the arms race and the space race became shorthand for technological and political supremacy.

The conflict had profound human consequences: the division of Germany and the erection of the Berlin Wall embodied the physical and psychological split; populations in regions such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America experienced decolonization entangled with superpower rivalry, often producing long-lasting political instability. At the same time, détente, arms-control negotiations (e.g., SALT), and later reform policies such as glasnost and perestroika changed the strategic calculus and ultimately contributed to the conflict's end.

For delegates, the Cold War is more than a sequence of events: it's a case study in how ideology, alliance politics, limited war, coercive diplomacy, and technological competition interact — and how miscalculation at critical moments can have outsized consequences.

5.3 Historical background: The ideological origins of the Cold War can be traced back to the October Revolution of 1917. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, overthrew the Provisional Government and established the world's first socialist state. This event alarmed the Western capitalist powers, which saw communism as an existential threat to the liberal order and free-market system. Between 1918 and 1920, during the Russian Civil War, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other powers intervened by supporting the White Army with troops, weapons, and funding. The Soviet Union never forgot this “imperialist invasion.”

During the interwar period, between 1919 and 1939, tensions intensified. The United States did not formally recognize the Soviet Union until 1933. Isolated, the Soviets created the Comintern in 1919 to promote worldwide revolution, reinforcing Western anti-communism. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, a non-aggression agreement between Stalin and Hitler, shocked the West by demonstrating that the Soviet Union prioritized its survival over anti-fascist ideology. The Munich Agreement of 1938, in which France and the United Kingdom allowed Hitler to annex parts of Czechoslovakia without consulting Stalin, fostered the Soviet perception that the West intended to redirect Nazi expansion eastward.

During the Second World War, a reluctant and mistrustful alliance formed between 1939 and 1945. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa, June 22, 1941) and the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) forced the creation of the Grand Alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Stalin demanded a second front in Western Europe to relieve pressure on the Red Army, which bore 80 percent of Allied casualties. The Normandy landings (June 6, 1944) came late from the Soviet perspective, after the USSR had lost 27 million people and suffered massive destruction.

Allied conferences exposed deep fractures. At Tehran (1943), postwar foundations were discussed. At Yalta (February 1945), Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed on the division of Germany, the creation of the United Nations, free elections in Eastern Europe, and new Polish borders; Stalin promised democratic governments but failed to fulfil this commitment. At Potsdam (July–August 1945), Truman informed Stalin of the atomic bomb, and disagreements emerged over reparations and Poland, which Stalin already controlled de facto.

The Soviet Union justified its expansion as a “security buffer” against historical invasions (1812, 1914, and 1941). The United States viewed it as ideological expansionism threatening liberal democracy.

When the war ended in 1945, the alliance quickly dissolved. The Soviet Union established communist regimes in Eastern Europe, violating the spirit of Yalta. In February 1946, Stalin declared capitalism incompatible with peace, and George Kennan sent the “Long Telegram,” recommending a policy of containment. On March 5, Churchill delivered his “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton. In September, Ambassador Novikov accused the United States of seeking global hegemony.

By 1947, the rupture was complete. The United Kingdom withdrew support from Greece and Turkey. On March 12, Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, pledging support for free peoples resisting communism. In June, the Marshall Plan offered massive economic aid; Stalin rejected it and responded by creating the Comecon in 1949. These developments solidified the bipolar division: a capitalist and democratic West versus a communist East. The Cold War was the inevitable result of irreconcilable ideologies, memories of invasion, a power vacuum in

Europe, and the nuclear arms race initiated by the United States in 1945 and by the Soviet Union in 1949.

5.4 Current situation: The immediate postwar world of 1946–1947 was a landscape of ruin, realignment, and rapid policy innovation—an interval in which wartime alliances fragmented and the structures of a new bipolar order began to take shape. In the aftermath of unprecedented destruction, states confronted intertwined humanitarian, economic, and security crises that exposed the limits of prewar diplomacy and accelerated competitive statecraft. This background brief synthesizes the principal political, economic, social, and diplomatic dynamics of that crucial period to assist delegates preparing for a committee on the origins of the Cold War.

The material and human toll of the Second World War left much of Europe and East Asia economically devastated and socially dislocated. Cities lay in ruins; transportation and agricultural systems were disrupted; millions were displaced; and shortages of food and fuel generated widespread instability. Recovery proceeded slowly and unevenly, creating fertile ground for political radicalization and social unrest. In this context, policies designed to reconstruct economies and restore political order acquired immediate strategic significance. Whether reconstruction would be based on market liberalization, state control, or centrally directed economies carried implications not only for domestic recovery but also for geopolitical alignment.

Against this backdrop, the geopolitical map that emerged by 1946 reflected both hard military realities and deepening ideological divergence. The wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union had been a coalition of necessity against the Axis; once the common enemy was defeated, fundamental contradictions resurfaced. The Soviet Union's security doctrine emphasized territorial buffers and politically compliant governments along its western frontier, while Western policymakers increasingly prioritized open markets, liberal institutions, and the containment of perceived expansion. In March 1946, Winston Churchill's speech popularizing the metaphor of an "iron curtain" crystallized public awareness of a growing East–West divide.

Military occupation zones and the presence of powerful armies created durable levers of influence. In Central and Eastern Europe, Soviet forces and local communist movements consolidated control over state institutions and security services, often justified in terms of wartime liberation and security needs. In Western Europe, the presence of Allied forces, combined with stronger ties to American markets and credit, oriented reconstruction toward Western institutions and liberal economic programs. Germany and Japan—the principal defeated powers—became focal points of occupation policy, denazification or demilitarization, and economic reorganization; their postwar governance structures both reflected and shaped broader patterns of alignment.

Economic stabilization and institutional architecture were central preoccupations. Wartime financial dislocation and postwar devastation generated an urgent need for mechanisms to restore trade, stabilize currencies, and finance reconstruction. The Bretton Woods institutions and the early operations of the International Monetary Fund signalled a turn toward managed international economic cooperation. Yet divergent visions persisted regarding the balance between national sovereignty and multilateral constraint, as well as the appropriate scope of state intervention in reconstruction. Economic fragility thus heightened political vulnerability, which actors on both sides of the emerging divide sought either to exploit or to mitigate.

Diplomacy in 1946–1947 operated on multiple levels: high-level conferences, occupation governance, and an expanding repertoire of propaganda and influence operations. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 provided a forum for continued negotiation, but it also institutionalized arenas in which superpower competition could unfold diplomatically and symbolically. Domestic politics within the leading states proved equally consequential. Leaders such as Harry S. Truman and Joseph Stalin made decisions under electoral pressures, economic constraints, and security anxieties that shaped both the tone and substance of foreign policy.

In Greece and Turkey, civil conflict and political instability exposed the limits of British capacity to sustain its traditional role as guarantor of regional stability, thereby opening space for expanded American involvement. The security environment was further transformed by the emerging nuclear dynamic. American possession of atomic weapons functioned both as a

deterrent and as a source of Soviet alarm; this asymmetry intensified secrecy, accelerated intelligence efforts, and encouraged rapid military planning.

Simultaneously, irregular conflicts and revolutionary movements—particularly in parts of Asia and the colonial world—ensured that competition between the emerging blocs would often manifest through local wars, political subversion, and support for allied regimes rather than direct confrontation between the great powers. Decolonization amplified global uncertainty. Nationalist movements across South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East pressed for independence, with the 1947 partition of British India illustrating both the scale of imperial retreat and the profound social upheaval it generated. Newly independent or soon-to-be independent states faced critical decisions regarding alignment, economic development, and internal political order, while both superpowers sought opportunities to cultivate influence.

By 1946–1947, the conceptual and institutional foundations of the Cold War were already taking shape. Public rhetoric, influential policy analyses, intelligence assessments, and the practical demands of occupation and reconstruction converged to produce doctrines and programs—containment strategies, economic assistance initiatives, and alliance-building efforts—that would be formalized in the late 1940s. The Greek crisis, British retrenchment, and subsequent American legislative responses in 1947 exemplify how localized contingencies catalysed systemic policy transformations.

5.5 Delegation Position Guide: In the aftermath of the Second World War, three distinct orientations emerged within the international system, each profoundly shaping the early Cold War landscape.

5.5.1 The socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, grounded its domestic and foreign policies in Marxism-Leninism, portraying capitalism as a crisis-ridden and ultimately declining system, while presenting communism as the inevitable and scientifically validated future of humanity. Although rhetorically defensive—framing its actions as necessary measures to safeguard the revolution—its conduct was often expansionist in practice. These regimes sought to consolidate authority through processes of sovietization, the establishment of single-party rule, the suppression of political pluralism, censorship, and periodic purges designed to eliminate perceived ideological deviation. Coordination

among communist parties was reinforced through institutions such as the Cominform, which aimed to unify messaging and strategy across Europe.

Economically, the bloc prioritized centralized planning, rapid heavy industrialization, and agricultural collectivization, emphasizing self-sufficiency and military-industrial capacity. Western initiatives, particularly the Marshall Plan, were denounced as instruments of “dollar imperialism,” and alternative structures such as Comecon were created to bind allied economies into a Soviet-centred system of trade and development. Strategically, the Truman Doctrine was interpreted as a declaration of ideological confrontation, prompting the reinforcement of buffer zones in Eastern Europe, the maintenance of large conventional forces, intensified intelligence operations, and sustained propaganda campaigns.

Abroad, influence was projected through material and political support for revolutionary movements, anti-colonial struggles, and sympathetic governments, complemented by cultural diplomacy designed to legitimize socialism as a model of modernization. Yet internal fissures—most notably the Yugoslav–Soviet split—demonstrated that ideological unity did not eliminate national interests or leadership rivalries, revealing a bloc more complex and internally contested than its public image suggested.

5.5.2 The capitalist bloc, by contrast, advanced a program of strategic containment coupled with liberal reconstruction. Rooted in pluralist democracy, constitutional governance, individual liberties, and market-based economies, Western states argued that political openness and rising living standards would naturally diminish the appeal of communism. Containment sought not immediate rollback but the prevention of further expansion, combining deterrence with long-term structural strengthening.

The Truman Doctrine institutionalized American support for governments confronting external pressure or internal insurgency, signalling a readiness to provide diplomatic backing, financial assistance, and, where deemed necessary, military aid. The Marshall Plan complemented this approach by delivering extensive economic resources to rebuild infrastructure, revive industrial production, restore trade networks, and integrate Western Europe into a cooperative economic framework aligned with liberal norms.

Security policy gradually evolved toward formalized collective defence, culminating in the creation of NATO in 1949, which institutionalized military coordination, standardized planning, and a shared deterrent posture. Alongside overt economic and security initiatives, Western governments employed covert operations, psychological warfare, media campaigns, and cultural exchanges to counter communist narratives and cultivate favourable public opinion abroad.

The promotion of multilateral institutions under the Bretton Woods system and the encouragement of European integration further embedded market principles and monetary stability into the postwar order. Nevertheless, contradictions persisted: the defence of democratic ideals sometimes coexisted uneasily with support for authoritarian anti-communist regimes, exposing tensions between strategic imperatives and proclaimed values.

5.5.3 Neutral and non-aligned states pursued independence and pragmatism within an increasingly polarized environment, resisting pressure to align formally with either superpower. Rejecting rigid bipolar dogma, these countries sought to preserve sovereignty, territorial integrity, and policy autonomy amid intensifying rivalry. Some adhered to long-standing traditions of strict neutrality, while others—particularly newly independent nations emerging from decolonization—crafted a distinct non-aligned identity centred on self-determination, economic development, and resistance to external domination.

Economically, many adopted mixed models that blended state planning with market mechanisms, engaging in trade and aid arrangements with both blocs while carefully balancing external partnerships to avoid dependency. Politically, they declined to join military alliances, restricted foreign bases on their territory, and emphasized diplomatic engagement through international forums. In several instances, they acted as mediators, hosts for negotiations, or advocates of peaceful coexistence.

Strategically, bipolar competition was perceived simultaneously as a threat to stability and as a source of leverage, enabling these states to extract economic or military concessions from competing patrons. Their posture reflected both vulnerability and agency, illustrating that

smaller and medium powers were not merely passive arenas of Cold War rivalry but active participants shaping its dynamics.

5.6 Main points of discussion: The Cold War was not merely a geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, but a systemic confrontation that tested sovereignty, collective security, economic governance, and the overall architecture of global stability. Crises from Berlin and Korea to Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were not isolated episodes, but interconnected stress tests within a fragile bipolar order. Each confrontation exposed structural tensions between deterrence, alliance credibility, ideological legitimacy, and domestic political pressures. To understand Cold War policymaking, these crises must be seen as components of a broader strategic system shaped by fear, competition, and mutual suspicion.

A central issue for this committee is the doctrine of containment. Western leaders justified containment as a defensive response to Soviet consolidation in Eastern Europe, yet in practice it expanded far beyond Europe. Through economic aid, covert operations, diplomatic pressure, and military engagement in third states—from Greece and Turkey to Latin America and Southeast Asia—containment often blurred the line between defensive stabilization and active interference. Delegates must assess whether this strategy preserved a necessary balance of power or undermined the sovereignty and political autonomy of developing nations under the banner of ideological security.

Alliance systems deepened the institutional divide. The creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact formalized military blocs and spheres of influence. While these structures strengthened deterrence and reassured member states, they also hardened divisions and limited diplomatic flexibility during crises. At the same time, the United Nations illustrated both the promise and limits of collective security. The Korean War showed that coordinated multilateral action was possible, yet the Security Council veto frequently paralyzed decision-making when superpower interests collided, transforming the UN into both mediator and arena of rivalry.

Nuclear deterrence introduced an even more profound strategic dilemma. The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction created a precarious equilibrium based on the certainty of catastrophic retaliation. The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated how miscalculation or

miscommunication could bring the world to the brink of nuclear war within days. Although the absence of direct superpower conflict is often cited as proof that deterrence worked, it also institutionalized a permanent condition of existential risk and normalized brinkmanship as a diplomatic tool.

Proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and other regions further complicated the moral and legal dimensions of the conflict. Local struggles for power, decolonization, or ideological direction became entangled with superpower competition, intensifying violence and prolonging instability. Economic statecraft also played a decisive role. Programs such as the Marshall Plan and the Bretton Woods system aimed to stabilize and integrate Western economies, while alternative models were promoted within the Soviet sphere. Competing visions of development were exported globally, often linking financial assistance to political alignment.

Technological and symbolic rivalry extended beyond the battlefield. The Space Race became a powerful demonstration of ideological legitimacy, scientific progress, and national prestige. Cultural diplomacy, media influence, and international institutions also became arenas of competition, shaping global perceptions of modernity and governance.

Ultimately, the Cold War reshaped alliances, institutions, and doctrines of security. The central question remains whether bipolar competition strengthened international order through balance of power and deterrence, or weakened it by normalizing distrust, interventionism, and permanent militarization—tensions whose legacy continues to influence global governance and strategic thinking today.

6. Questionnaire

1. Why did Eastern and Western Europe become politically divided after 1945?
2. In what ways was your country affected by the outcome of World War II, and how does that affect your current foreign policy priorities?
3. What was the Truman Doctrine, its purpose and how did it affect the international system?
4. Does your delegation support the policy of containment or consider it an act of interference in sovereign states? Why?
5. How does your country position itself regarding economic reconstruction programs such as the Marshall Plan or Soviet Union's economic cooperation?
6. What is your delegation's opinion about the establishment of military alliances (such as NATO or Soviet security arrangements)? Are they stabilizing or provocative?
7. To what extent is your delegation willing to prioritize national security over the principles of sovereignty and self-determination established in the UN Charter?
8. How does your country perceive the use of espionage and intelligence operations as instruments of foreign policy during peacetime?
9. What internal challenges (economic, political, social, or military) limit your delegation's ability to act internationally? What can your delegation do to counter those challenges?
10. In the case of a direct confrontation between major powers, would your delegation align firmly with one bloc, attempt mediation, or remain neutral? What are the strategic risks of that decision?

7. Summoned delegations

1. Australia
2. Brazil
3. Bulgaria
4. Canada
5. Cuba
6. Czechoslovakia
7. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
8. Federal Republic of Germany
9. France
10. German Democratic Republic.
11. India
12. Italy
13. Japan
14. Mexico
15. People's Republic of China
16. Poland
17. Republic of Korea
18. State of Vietnam/Republic of Vietnam
19. Turkey
20. Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
21. United Arab Republic/Egypt
22. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
23. United States of America
24. Vietcong/Socialist Republic of Vietnam
25. Yugoslavia

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9. Rules of procedure

1. **LEGALITY.** These rules of procedure are the unique protocol criterion of this simulation. The ULSACMUN's Organizing Committee will have the final statement if there were any kind of misunderstanding or controversy about their meaning or application.

2. **OFFICIAL LANGUAGE.** English will be the official language, at any time during the sessions, in the committees mentioned in the heading of this document.

3. **ORGANIZING COMMITTEE.** The Organizing Committee is composed by the Executive Committee (Secretary General, Sub-Secretaries and Academic Advisor), and by each committee's Chair (President, Conference Officer and Moderator).

4. **STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARIAT.** The Secretary General, or a member of the Organizing Committee designated by them may, at any time, make either written or oral statements to the Committees. Those statements, for the purposes of this simulation, will be definitive.

5. **DELEGATIONS.** During each session, in any given committee, each delegation may be composed of one and only one delegate, representing just one state/company/organization/ representation, and having the right to cast just one vote.¹

6. **OBSERVERS.** They shall be considered as observers those who represent a state/company/organization that does not count on the Member status in the committee. Observers do not have the right to cast a vote during amendments and resolutions. However, they can participate during the debate with the same rights of any member, and they must be recognized by the Chair of the committee.

7. **EXTERNAL VISITORS (teachers, faculties, relatives and friends).** External visitors must have the authorization of the Organizing Committee to be allowed to watch the debate. Under no circumstances can an external visitor interfere, in any way, during the simulation.

8. **POSITION PAPER/ QUESTIONNAIRES:** As part of his/her participation, each delegate must elaborate and deliver, to the Chair of the committee, a Position Paper document with the pertinent data

¹ In some cases, a delegate can have a "double delegation". That will imply to represent a different state/company/organization/advisory in each of the topics of the Agenda. In those cases, the delegates will adjust their position papers and questionnaires to fulfill with the requirements of this simulation.

and the official position of the state/company/organization represented. The delegates/representatives must also answer and deliver the questionnaires included in the Handbooks. Delegates must deliver their position paper in the designated due date established by the Organizing Committee and a printed copy during the first session of the simulation. Delegates/representatives that fail to comply with these requirements may be granted with a warning.

9. **USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES:** The use of electronic devices (laptops, tablets, cellphones, etc.) is permitted if the Chair allows it.

10. **POWERS OF THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE.** The authority during any given session of any given committee will fall on the Chair members, with the following precisions:

a) The highest level of authority is with the *President*, being her/his decisions unappealable. The President will declare the session opening or closing and can also suggest procedures that in her/his opinion will contribute to the fluency of debate.

b) The *Moderator* has the function of directing the debate, granting the word to delegates, and helping debate to be fluid and effective. In the absence of the President, the Moderator will assume the duties of the presidency.

c) The *Conference Officer* will help with President and Moderator tasks, during formal sessions. He/she will also register votes, resolve any inconvenience that may occur to delegates, and will help with communication between them through written messages, and personally.

Any member of the Chair will be able to assist delegates with the possible course of the debate and/or any other matters related to this simulation.

11. **MAJORITY CRITERIA.** There are 2 types of criteria to consider in a voting procedure. In both cases the totality of the present delegations/representations, present and approved are considered to participate in the session, excepting those occasions in which only members can vote. The use of each specific majority depends on the situation:

a) *Simple majority:* Implies 50% +1 (fifty percent plus one) of present delegations/representations. It is used in almost every procedure to vote, except for the closure of debate.

b) *Qualified majority:* 2/3 (two thirds) of present delegations/representations. To be used in case of voting on closing debate to pass into voting a resolution or amendment.

12. **QUORUM.** To declare a debate session officially opened, the President has to declare the existence of *quorum*. To do so, at least a simple majority of the total delegates/representatives summoned must be present. This requirement is also needed when voting for an amendment or a resolution.

13. **COURTESY.** All delegates/representatives must show, in every moment, respect and courtesy toward the Chair and all present delegates/representatives.

14. **DIPLOMATIC NOTES.** Unless the Committee is on the Open Floor or in any type of Caucus, delegates/representatives must maintain all communication exclusively in written form, through Diplomatic Notes. These notes must be sent through the members of the Chair of the Committee, who may be assisted by other members of the Organizing Committee of ULSACMUN. The improper use of Diplomatic Notes may cause the delegates/representatives to be subject to a warning.

15. **WARNINGS.** In case of breaking any rule, the Chair or any member of the Organizing Committee can give a warning to any delegate. When a delegate/ representative is given two warnings in the same session, he/she must leave the session, and he/she won't be able to come back until the next one. If the delegate/representative receives three warnings during the model, her/his participation will be suspended permanently.

16. **OPEN FLOOR.** It is considered an open floor only when the Moderator or the President has expressed it to the committee. The floor must be open to establish any motion of procedure or point of parliamentary inquiry.

17. **AGENDA.** The first action of the committee will be to establish the order of the Agenda. To do so, delegates/representatives must follow the next steps:

a) A motion should be made to put a topic first on the agenda. This motion requires a second.

b) An extraordinary Speakers List of two delegates/representatives for and two delegates against the motion will be established and each one of those four delegates will state his/her arguments in a speech of no longer than 30 seconds.

c) Automatically, after the speeches mentioned in the previous point, a voting will be made to open the debate with the proposed topic. If the voting has a positive simple majority, the debate will begin with the proposed topic. Otherwise, automatically the debate will begin with the other topic of the Agenda.

d) A motion to proceed to the second topic area will only be in order after the Committee has adopted or rejected a resolution on the first topic. If a resolution on the first topic is accepted, the process to begin with the second topic will be automatic. In case the resolution is rejected, the motion to proceed to a second topic is open to debate, to the extent of one speaker in favor and one against. This motion requires a vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting to pass. If the motion fails, the Committee will continue in the first topic, in the process of revising or amending the proposed resolution.

18. **SPEAKERS LIST.** Once the Committee has chosen the topic to begin the debate, the only acceptable motion will be the one to open the Speakers' List. This motion needs to be seconded; however, it doesn't need to be voted.

The speakers list will be opened with the delegations who have requested it. After that, any country can ask for its inclusion on the list by raising the placard and asking for a motion to be added or by a diplomatic note addressed to the Chair.

By decision of ULSACMUN's Organizing Committee, the Speakers List will be exclusively used for the time needed for the members of the Committee to present, in a unique participation per delegate/representative, their official position towards the discussed topic. After that has been accomplished, the Chair will have the power to manage the rest of the time assigned to the topic, through Simple and Moderated Caucuses.

19. **SPEECHES.** Delegates/representatives cannot address the committee without authorization of the Chair. Any Chair member can call a speaker to come to order if he/she is deviating from the topic of the discussion. Speeches must be made in such a way that it's clear that the delegates represent the position of a nation/enterprise/organization. That is why delegates must abstain in using the *first person* when establishing their speeches. Failing to fulfill this requirement may cause the delegate to earn a warning.

20. **SPEECHES TIME LIMIT.** The Chair will establish the time that every delegate must speak, inside a margin of 10 seconds as minimum and 3 minutes as maximum time. The Moderator will call the delegate to order if he/she exceeds the time limit to speak. A time limit change can also be proposed by any delegate; it must be seconded and approved by simple majority. The President can call out of order this motion and his/her decision will be unappealable.

21. **YIELDS.** A delegate/representative who has been accepted to speak about a topic on the Speakers' List must yield his/her time in one of the ways shown below. The delegate/representative must tell his/her decision to the Chair when he/she finishes his/her speech.

a) *To another delegate/representative:* The other delegate/representative can use the remaining time but can't yield it again. If the one that is receiving the time doesn't accept it, the yielder can be granted with a warning.

b) *To other delegates'/representatives' questions:* The delegates/representatives that will be asking the questions will be chosen by the Moderator and can only ask one question (with the right to a follow-up question). Time will be discounted from the answers of the speaker.

c) *To the Chair:* This option implies that the remaining time can no longer be used in any way. This option must be used even if the time has expired completely.

IMPORTANT NOTE: If the delegate/representative does not yield his/her remaining time in any of the above options, the Chair can give a maximum of two delegates the right to comment about the speaker's speech, and these comments can't be replied to by the speaker.

22. **EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF QUESTIONS.** As a decision of ULSACMUN's Organizing Committee, to keep the fluency of the debate, this resource won't be available during this simulation. The opportunity to question another delegate/representative will be present during Simple and Moderated Caucus.

23. **POINT OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.** Whenever a delegate/representative experiences personal discomfort which impairs his/her ability to participate in the proceedings; he/she may rise to a Point of Personal Privilege to request discomfort to be corrected. While a Point of Personal Privilege may interrupt a speaker, delegates/representatives should use this power with the utmost discretion, to avoid being granted with a warning for the abuse of it.

24. **POINT OF ORDER.** During the discussion of any matter, a delegate/representative may rise to a Point of Order to indicate an instance of improper parliamentary procedure. The Point of Order will be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these rules of procedure. The President may rule "out of order" those points that are dilatory or improper; such a decision is unappealable. A delegate/representative rising to a Point of Order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion. A Point of Order may only interrupt a speaker if the speech itself is not following proper parliamentary procedure.

25. **POINT OF PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY.** When the floor is open, a delegate/representative may rise to a Point of Parliamentary Inquiry to ask the members of the Chair a question regarding the rules of procedure. A Point of Parliamentary Inquiry may never interrupt a speaker. Delegates/representatives with substantive questions about the topic should not rise to this Point but should rather approach the committee during caucus or in written form through a Diplomatic Note.

26. **RIGHT OF REPLY.** A delegate/representative whose personal or national integrity has been harmed by another delegate may request a Right of Reply through a Diplomatic Note addressed to the Chair. The Chair's decision whether to grant the Right of Reply is unappealable. A delegate/representative who has been granted a Right of Reply will not address the committee, and she/he will be granted a warning. A Right of Reply to a Right of Reply is out of order.

27. **SIMPLE CAUCUS (OPEN DEBATE).** A motion to open a simple caucus will be in order at any time when the floor is open. To open a simple caucus, the delegate/representative making the motion must briefly explain its purpose and specify a time limit for the caucus that, under no circumstances, will exceed thirty minutes. The motion will immediately be put to a vote. A simple majority of the present members is required for passage. The President may rule the motion as out of order and his/her decision is unappealable.

28. **MODERATED CAUCUS.** In a moderated caucus, the Chair will call on delegates/representatives to speak at his/her discretion, always under the authority of the Moderator.

A motion for a moderated caucus is in order at any time when the floor is open. However, the President may rule the motion as out of order and her/his decision is unappealable. The delegate making the motion must specify a time limit for the caucus, not to exceed twenty minutes. Once raised, the motion will be voted, with a simple majority of present members required for passage.

All speeches during the moderated caucus must be brief to promote the participation of all delegates, with a limit time of 2 minutes. The Chair can interrupt speeches that exceed the established limit, and that decision will be considered as definitive.

Also, with the purpose of facilitating substantive debate at critical junctures in the discussion, the Organizing Committee of ULSACMUN has decided to *allow direct contact and questioning between delegates/representatives*. In the same sense, delegates/representatives must abstain to establish any Point of Order related to the use of the first person in the speeches. That resource will be exclusive to the Chair, which could grant a warning to delegates/representatives that persist in that kind of behavior.

29. **ROUND ROBIN:** Delegates/representatives may propose the motion of a round robin during the time of the debate. During this time, *all* delegates/ representatives present in the forum must speak for a maximum of 1 minute on the current topic, the order of participation will follow the list of delegates/representatives managed by the Chair. Delegates have the right to pass during their turn in the Round Robin.

30. **APPROVAL COMMISSION.** A working paper or a draft resolution must be first revised by the Approval Commission, which will be composed by the President and the Conference Officer of each Committee. This Approval Commission will answer directly to the Secretary General and might suggest modifications of form, but not of content. Eventually any member of the Executive Committee may be part of the Approval Commission.

31. **WORKING PAPER/MINUTE.** A working paper/minute is a document in which the main ideas of solution are exposed. It is the background of a resolution paper/treaty. Working papers/minutes follow a very simple format (Watch the attachment: Sample Working Paper) and, even though they are not official documents, they do require the signature of at least 1/3 of present delegates/representatives and of the Approval Commission to be presented and discussed. A working paper/minute that doesn't present these requirements cannot be officially presented for its discussion.

32. **RESOLUTION PAPER/TREATY.** Every Resolution Paper/Treaty should include solutions to the topic the committee is discussing. A member of the Approval Commission must sign the Resolution Paper/Treaty, and this should be signed by at least 1/3 of the present members and follow the appropriate format (Watch the attachment: Sample Resolution). Once the Resolution Paper/Treaty is approved by the Approval Commission it will be presented to the committee so they can debate about it. No Resolution Paper/Treaty written before the simulation can be presented nor debated. A Resolution/Treaty can only be presented when most of the speakers tell their opinion about the topic. The Chair will invite two delegates that, in 3 minutes maximum, should read the document.

32. **AMENDMENTS.** Delegates may amend any Resolution/Treaty which has been introduced. An amendment must have the approval of the Approval Commission and the signatures of at least 1/3 of the present members to be read and discussed. Amendments to amendments are out order; however, an amendment part of a resolution may be further amended. Preambulatory phrases may not be amended.

The final vote on an amendment is procedural: all present members must vote. An approved amendment may be introduced when the floor is open. The President will recognize two speakers

against the motion to close debate, and a vote of two-thirds is required for closure. Amendments need a simple majority to pass.

33. **CLOSURE OF DEBATE.** Being the floor open, a delegate may propose a motion to close debate on the substantive or procedural matter under discussion. The President may, subject to appeal, rule such a motion dilatory. When closure of debate is proposed, the President may recognize up to two speakers against the motion. No speaker in favor of the motion will be recognized. Closure of debate requires the support of two-thirds of the members present. If the Committee is in favor of closure, the Moderator will declare the closure of the debate, and all resolutions and amendments on the floor will be brought to an immediate Roll-Call voting.

34. **ROLL-CALL VOTING.** After debate is closed on any topic, any delegate may propose a motion to begin a roll-call voting. In a roll call vote, the President will call countries in alphabetical order, to express their vote in three separated rounds:

a) *First round:* Delegates may vote “Yes,” “No,” “Abstain,” or “Pass.” A delegate who does not pass may request the right to explain his/her vote.

b) *Second round:* Delegates/representatives who asked for a right of explanation during the first round must explain their vote in a brief speech of no more than 30 seconds. Also, delegates/representatives who passed during the first round of the roll call must vote during the second round. The same delegate may not request the right to explain his/her vote.

c) *Third round:* The President will call for any reconsiderations of vote.

Note: Delegates/ representatives under the *status* of “observers” won’t be considered for the roll call voting. However, they will be allowed to stay in the room.

35. **SESSION CLOSURE.** When the floor is open, a delegate may propose a motion to close the session until the next session or the definitive closure. A simple majority of the present members is required for passage. The President may rule the motion as out of order and her/his decision is unappealable.

These rules were revised and approved in March 2026 by:



Ramón Hurtado Calzada and Luis Mario Pinkus Ramírez
Secretary Generals of ULSACMUN 2026



Mariana Leticia Benítez Caballero and María Fernanda Olvera Dueñas
Subsecretarias de Protocol Subsecretary of ULSACMUN 2026



LRI. Luis Humberto Nava Navarrete
Academic Advisor of ULSACMUN 2026

10. Rules addendum: Gamification system

This committee stands out radically from traditional models. It is not merely about debating diplomatic positions or defending national interests from the comfort of a prepared speech. Here, skills of improvisation, strategic analysis, and constant attention to multiple variables at play will be tested simultaneously. Delegates must demonstrate not only their command of history and politics but also their ingenuity in adapting to a dynamic and ever-changing environment.

The dynamics of this committee incorporate elements of a **board game**, where chance and strategy intertwine. Dice become a decisive instrument: each roll can open new opportunities or trigger unexpected crises. The result of a throw is not just a number; it represents the uncertainty that accompanies every political and military decision. Thus, delegates must learn to manage both their countries' resources and the consequences of a destiny that, at times, escapes their control.

This system seeks to recreate the tension of international politics in times of crisis, where every move can alter the global balance. Delegates will have to constantly monitor their economy, alliances, military capabilities, and intelligence operations, while facing the pressure of invasions, espionage, and press releases that may change the course of debate. Improvisation will be key: it will not be enough to follow a rigid plan, but rather they must react quickly to the unexpected, defend their interests with cunning, and seize every opportunity that arises.

In this committee, the experience is not limited to academic argumentation. It is an **immersive simulation**, designed for participants to live the complexity of international politics as if it were a constantly shifting board. The table, the dice, and the rules are not obstacles but catalysts of creativity and strategy. Those who manage to adapt, persuade, and anticipate the twists of the game will be the ones who truly master the dynamics of this committee.

A. Espionage: Espionage is a strategic tool that delegates may request anonymously through a diplomatic note addressed to the chair. Once the operation is approved, dice will be

rolled on screen, and the outcome will determine the success or failure of the mission. It is important to emphasize that **nations allied with one another cannot be spied upon**, and the consequences of each attempt may significantly alter the committee's dynamics.

There are three types of espionage:

- **Type 1:** Provides information about the internal situation of each country, including possible breaches or coups. Recommended in advanced stages of debate, as it can serve as “dirt” against other delegations. Failure reduces the education percentage by half, generates internal problems, and imposes sanctions on the GDP in health and education. Success requires at least 3 points on the dice.
- **Type 2:** Reveals data about national leaders, their political relations, and tentative alliances. Failure results in the same information being leaked about the country that ordered the espionage. Success requires a minimum of 8 points on the dice.
- **Type 3:** Allows discovery of an imminent armed movement. If successful, the committee is informed and the military plan is thwarted, intensifying debate. If it fails, the attack proceeds under invasion rules. Affected delegates may defend themselves through proposal letters, increasing intelligence and military percentages, or exposing the threat during debate. Success requires at least 15 points on the dice.

When espionage succeeds, the information is communicated privately to the requesting delegation, except in Type 3, which is announced publicly to the committee.

In the event of a failed Level 1 espionage attempt, 5% of the military GDP will be blocked until the next crisis. If a Level 2 attempt fails, 10% of the military GDP and 5% of intelligence will be blocked. Finally, if a Level 3 attempt fails, 15% of the military GDP and 10% of intelligence will be blocked. Also, the failed espionage missions of Levels 2 and 3 will be publicly exposed to the committee.

B. Economy: Each country's economy is based on its **initial GDP**, which determines the starting amount of military arsenal and intelligence. Delegates' decisions directly influence

economic growth or decline, affecting key sectors such as military, health, education, intelligence, invasions, and espionage:

- **Military:** Every 15% invested grants one additional die, useful for defense against invasions or for promoting military movements.

- **Health:** Low investment leads to epidemics, criticism of representatives, and social unrest.

- **Education:** High investment favors propaganda, alliances, and population control. Low investment produces a vulnerable population, susceptible to foreign ideologies and prone to coups.

- **Intelligence:** Increases espionage success rates and strengthens protection against attacks. Low levels expose the country to leaks and vulnerability. High levels, combined with other sectors, boost the economy and reduce dice costs.

- **Invasions:** Successful invasions allow acquisition of up to 60% of the GDP and territory of the attacked country. Failure results in a 20% loss of total GDP and a 15% reduction in the military sector.

- **Espionage:** Requires payment to the chair and dice rolls. Types 1 and 2 provide information; Type 3 activates invasion rules.

NOTE: Each delegation is required to modify its GDP distribution at the beginning of each crisis and send that distribution to the Chair via diplomatic note.

C. **Strategic Combos:** Combos represent **synergies** between key sectors of a country's economy and politics. When certain investment thresholds are reached, delegations gain additional benefits that reduce costs, strengthen defences, or facilitate military and espionage operations.

1. **Health + Intelligence**

- 35% in health + 15% in intelligence → 5% cost reduction.
- 45% in health + 25% in intelligence → 10% cost reduction.
- Example: a 15% military investment counts as such but consumes only 10% of GDP.

2. **Education + Intelligence**

- 40% in education + 25% in intelligence → protection against enemy attacks, removing one die from the invader.

3. **Military + Intelligence**

- 15% in military + 10% in intelligence → espionage adjustments:
 - Level 1: unchanged.
 - Level 2: reduced from 8 to 6 points.
 - Level 3: reduced from 15 to 14 points.
- +10% additional in intelligence → Level 2 reduced to 5, Level 3 reduced to 12.

NOTE: For these last two combinations delegates are required to choose between applying the discount or adding one dice. The maximum number of additional dice that may be added is one.

D. Invasions: Invasions are triggered when a Type 3 espionage is approved. Only major powers, **the U.S. and the USSR**, may apply them directly. Other powers require a security justification, while minor countries must submit a proposal letter.

- **U.S. and USSR:** must reach 18 points on the dice, adjusted by intelligence percentage. They may roll up to 5 dice. If the attacked country has an intelligence combo, one die is subtracted from the attacker.
- **Other powers:** initial cost is 15 points, reduced to 14 with 15% intelligence and to 12 with 30%. They may roll up to 4 dice, with the same defensive possibility for the attacked country.

E. Proposal Letter: Minor countries may submit a proposal letter to request economic support or direct involvement of a major power in a conflict. These alliances must respect historical logic and adhere to the debate process. Such letters can be decisive in balancing forces during critical situations.

F. Press Releases: Delegates may send press releases through diplomatic notes, which will be read aloud before the committee. These may contain information obtained through espionage or even fabricated data designed to strengthen a speech. The chair will evaluate the truthfulness and relevance of the release and decide whether it will be included in the committee's official news bulletin.

11. About the Working Papers

Structure of a Working Paper/Minute:

a) HEADING: The title should be centered, in capital letters, above the main body of the Working Paper. The title can be as simple as “WORKING PAPER”. On the left margin and two lines below the title should be the Committee, the Topic name, and the Sponsors of the working paper.

b) BODY: The Working Paper is written in the format of a list of concrete, detailed, with the following rules:

- The list of points is preceded by a short introduction phrase such as: “We are convinced that the solution to this topic must be based in the following points”:
- The points of list should be clearly numbered. Those numbers should be mentioned when presenting the approved Working Paper to the Committee, this to facilitate both the hearing and discussion of its content.
- All points should be thought up to help the committee find a solution to the topic. In this sense there should be propositional, positive points. Also, these points should be as concrete and detailed as possible.
- All points included should be well drafted, paying special attention to their grammar and spelling.

NOTE: As stated in Article 31 of the Rules of Procedure, a Working Paper/Minute requires the signature of 1/3 of present delegates and of the Approval Commission to be presented and discussed by the Committee.

SAMPLE WORKING PAPER

Committee: Security Council

Topic: Crisis in Burundi

Sponsors: Norway, Mexico and Russian Federation

The sponsors of this working paper are convinced that the solution to this topic must be based in the following points:

1. The coup d'état is to be identified as the main cause of the sudden and violent interruption of the democratic process in Burundi.
2. It is necessary to realize the pertinent legal reforms.
3. An immediate cease fire is urgent, as well as the return of all armed forces to their headquarters.
4. It is also mandatory an immediate restoration of democracy and of a constitutional regime.
5. Support to the peace efforts realized by the UN Secretary General, the African Union and the countries in the region, as well as promoting an ordered return to constitutional regime and the respect to democratic institutions in Burundi.
6. Acknowledgement of the special envoy of the UN Secretary General to the zone.
7. Emergency humanitarian aid to Burundi (from either member of the UN or NGO's).
8. To keep the debate, open at the Security Council until a real and effective solution to this topic is reached.

12. About the Resolution projects

STRUCTURE OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:

a) HEADING: The title should be centered, in capital letters, above the main body of the resolution. The title can be as simple as “DRAFT RESOLUTION”. On the left margin and two lines below the title should be the committee and topic name.

NOTE: There are no sponsors of a resolution. The signatures are only there to show that the committee wants to discuss the resolution. The names of “sponsors” should not be included.

b) BODY: The resolution is written in the format of a long sentence, with the following rules:

- The resolution begins with The General Assembly for all GA committees and with The Economic and Security Council for all ECOSOC committees. The Specialized Agencies use their own names as the introductory line. The rest of the resolution consists of clauses with the first word of each clause underlined.

- The next section, consisting of Pre-ambulatory Clauses, describes the problem being addressed, recalls past actions taken, explains the purpose of the resolution, and offers support for the operative clauses that follow each clause in the preamble beings with an underlined word and ends with a comma.

- Operative Clauses are numbered and state the action to be taken by the body. These clauses all begin with present tense active verbs, which are generally stronger words than those used in the Preamble. Each operative clause is followed by a semi-colon except the last, which ends with a period.

SAMPLE RESOLUTION

Committee: Science and Technology Commission (ECOSOC)

Topic: Free flow of information.

- 1) The Economic and Security Council:
- 2)
- 3) *Recalling* its Resolution A/36/89 of 16 December 1981, “The Declaration on
- 4) Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to
- 5) Peace and International Understanding,”
- 6) *Recalling also* Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
- 7) “Everyone has the right to receive and impart information and ideas through any
- 8) media and regardless of frontiers,”
- 9) *Recognizing* that the problem of news flows imbalance is that two-way
- 10) information among countries of a region is either non-existent or insufficient
- 11) information exchanged between regions of the world is inadequate,
- 12) *Realizing* the need for all Sovereign Nations to maintain their integrity and still
- 13) play an active role in the international system.
- 14)
- 15) Proposes the following points:
- 16)
- 17) **1) Recommends** that a three-level information interchange system be
- 18) established on the National, Regional, and international levels to ameliorate
- 19) the current problems of news flow imbalance, with the three-level system

20) operating as follows:

21) a) Each region's member nations will report their national information and

22) receive information of other nations in their region from the regional level 23) of this interchange system.

24) b) Nations will decide the character of the news flow media best suited to the 25) need of their sovereign territory, be this printed, audio, or audio-visual.

26) c) Regional News Gathering Agencies will serve to gather information from the

27) nations in their region, and these boards will have no editorial discretion and

28) will serve to forward all information to the International Board.

29) d) Each regional agency will be composed of representatives from every

30) member nation of the region.

31) e) The primary function of the International Board will be to translate

32) information accumulated from the regional news gathering agencies.

33) f) The secondary purpose will be to transmit all information gathered back to

34) the member nations via the regional news gathering agencies;

35) **2) Urges** the establishment of the University of International Communications,

36) with main branch in Geneva, Switzerland, and additional branches located in 37) each of the regions, to pursue the following aims:

38) a) The University and branches will be established with the express purpose of

39) bringing together world views and facilitating the transfer of technology;

40) b) All member nations of the United Nations will be equally represented at the

41) University.

42) c) Incentives will be offered to students of journalism and communications at

43) the University to return to their countries to teach upon completion of

- 44) instruction;
- 45) d) The instructors of the regional education centers will be comprised of
- 46) multipartisan coalition of educators from throughout the world.
- 47) **3) Calls** for the continued use of funds from the International Program for the
- 48) Development of Communications, Special Account, UNICEF, the UN
- 49) Development Program, and other sources of funding include national
- 50) governments and private donors.
- 51) **4) Recommends** that the distribution of funds be decided by the IPDC.

13. Preambulatory and operative clauses

PREAMBULATORY AND OPENING CLAUSES

Affirming	Expecting	Keeping in mind
Alarmed by	Expressing its appreciation	Noting further
Approving	Expressing its satisfaction	Noting with regret
Aware of	Fulfilling	Noting with satisfaction
Believing	Fully aware	Noting with deep concern
Bearing in mind	Fully alarmed	Noting further
Cognizant of	Fully believing	Noting with approval
Confident	Further developing	Observing
Contemplating	Further recalling	Realizing
Convinced	Guided by	Reaffirming
Declaring	Having adopted	Recalling
Deeply concerned	Having considered	Recognizing
Deeply conscious	Having considered further	Referring
Deeply convinced	Having devoted attention	Seeking
Deeply disturbed	Having examined	Taking into account
Deeply regretting	Having Heard	Taking note
Desiring	Having received	Viewing with appreciation
Emphasizing	Having studied	Welcoming

OPERATIVE CLAUSES

Accepts	Emphasizes	Proclaims
Affirms	Encourages	Reaffirms
Approves	Endorses	Recommends
Authorizes	Expresses its appreciation	Reminds
Calls for	Expresses its hope	Regrets
Calls upon	Further invites	Requests
Condemns	Further proclaims	Resolves
Congratulates	Further reminds	Solemnly affirms
Confirms	Further recommends	Strongly condemns
Considers	Further requests	Supports
Declares accordingly	Further resolves	Takes note of
Deplores	Has resolved	Trusts
Draws attention	Notes	Urges
Designates		

14. Schedule of ULSACMUN 2026

Lunes 11		Martes 12		Miércoles 13	
7:00-7:50	Registro	7:00-7:50	Séptima sesión	7:00-8:20	Decimoquinta Sesión
7:50-8:30	Inauguración	7:55-8:45	Octava sesión		
8:30-9:40	Conferencia	8:50-9:40	Novena sesión	8:30-9:40	Panel de testimonios
9:40-10:10	Receso	9:40-10:10	Receso	9:40-10:10	Receso
10:10-11:00	Primera sesión	10:10-11:00	Décima sesión	10:10-11:00	Decimosexta sesión
11:05-11:55	Segunda sesión	11:05-11:55	Undécima sesión	11:05-11:55	Premiación en comités
11:55-12:15	Receso	11:55-12:15	Receso	11:55-12:15	Receso
12:15-13:05	Tercera sesión	12:15-13:05	Duodécima sesión	12:15-14:00	Premiación y clausura
13:05-14:00	Cuarta sesión	13:05-14:00	Decimotercera sesión		
14:00-16:00	Comida	14:00-16:00	Comida		
16:00-16:55	Quinta Sesión	16:00-16:55	Decimocuarta sesión		
16:55-17:10	Refrigerio	16:55-17:10	Refrigerio		
17:10-18:00	Sexta sesión	17:10-18:00	Presentación artística		