2026
ULSACMUN

HANDBOOK FOR DELEGATES

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

Contents

1. Message from the Secretary General

Dear Delegates, Board Members and Staff, Advisors, and Press,

It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to the 2026 edition of ULSACMUN, taking place on May 11, 12, and 13. As members of the General Secretariat, it is an honor to accompany you all throughout these three days in this meaningful experience for the entire community.

This Model United Nations was organized with the vision of empowering young people to actively participate in generating meaningful change in our society. We firmly believe that, through values such as service, justice, solidarity, equality, respect, commitment, and diplomacy, we can build a better environment for all—a more just and equitable one—and above all, one where all ideas are considered to build humane and sustainable foundations, ultimately leading to a better world.

Likewise, ULSACMUN 2026 features new committees designed to spark delegates' interest in historical, current, and fictional topics. Throughout the three days of the model, you will participate in these committees with enthusiasm and a commitment to resolving any challenges that may arise. We thank you for your participation and for choosing this model to enrich your experience as MUN members. We hope you leave proud of having participated and been part of this edition. The responsibility each of you carries is to change the world and understand it from many perspectives. We encourage you to give your all in this edition and, most importantly, enjoy the wonderful ULSACMUN experience.

Once again, thank you for your participation and for being part of ULSACMUN 2026.

Indivisa Manent, we remain united.

Ramón Hurtado Calzada
Secretary General of ULSACMUN 2026

Luis Mario Pinkus Ramírez
Secretary General of ULSACMUN 2026

2. Message from the Chair

Dear delegates:

On behalf of the upcoming of the DISEC meeting, we would like to warmly welcome all distinguished delegates to this committee. It is an honor to have representatives from around the world gathered to engage in meaningful debate and diplomatic dialogue. We sincerely thank you for your preparation, commitment, and willingness to contribute your ideas to this conference. Your participation is what makes this committee dynamic, fulfilling, and impactful.

As the Disarmament and International Security Committee, DISEC serves as a fundamental body within the United Nations General Assembly. Our purpose is to address global threats to peace and security, including disarmament, arms control, emerging military technologies, and biosecurity challenges. Through structured debate, negotiation, and resolution drafting, this committee provides a platform where nations can collaborate to promote stability and strengthen international law.

Throughout this conference, DISEC seeks to encourage critical thinking, respectful diplomacy, and innovative solutions to complex global issues. We aim to foster cooperation among member states, promote accountability and transparency, and develop realistic proposals that contribute to long-term international peace and security. We look forward to seeing your leadership, diplomacy, and dedication reflected in every session.

Welcome to DISEC and to ULSACMUN 2026!

Sofía Nava Botello
Moderator

Sofía Noriega Woodrow
President

Leonardo Galván Rodríguez
Conference Officer

3. Purposes and Principles of the United Nations

Taken from Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter:

Article 1: The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1.   To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

2.   To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3.   To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4.   To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2: The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1 shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1.   The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2.   All Members, to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3.   All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4.   All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United

Nations.

5.   All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6.   The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7.   Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

4. About the Disarmament and International Security Committee

4.1 Background of the committee. The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was created in 1945 as part of the United Nations General Assembly after World War II, with the aim of preventing future conflicts through disarmament and arms regulation. Established in response to the unprecedented destruction caused by global warfare, including the use of nuclear weapons, DISEC became the primary forum within the General Assembly dedicated to issues of international security. Throughout its history, the committee has addressed major Cold War tensions, nuclear arms races, and the development of international treaties aimed at limiting the proliferation of weapons. Its mandate focuses on maintaining international peace and security, including the control and reduction of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction through multilateral cooperation.

4.2 Purpose and Objectives of the Committee. DISEC serves as a platform where member states discuss and evaluate threats to international stability such as nuclear proliferation, conventional weapons, emerging military technologies, terrorism, and the militarization of new domains, including cyberspace and outer space. Its primary objective is to promote global peace by encouraging dialogue, negotiation, and consensus-building among nations. Through the drafting of resolutions and recommendations, the committee seeks to strengthen arms control efforts, prevent conflict, and ensure that security challenges are addressed within a framework of international law and cooperation.

4.3 Structure and Functions of the Committee. As the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, DISEC includes all UN member states, each with equal participation and voting rights. The committee operates through formal debates, moderated and unmoderated caucuses, and the drafting of working papers and resolutions. Its functions include promoting disarmament initiatives, analyzing emerging security threats such as cyber warfare and new military technologies, and supporting compliance with key international treaties. By fostering transparency, confidence-building measures, and diplomatic dialogue, DISEC plays a central role in reinforcing collective security and preventing future conflicts.

5.   Topic A: Use of Military Drones in International Operations

5.1 Linked SDG's

SDG 16: Operations with military drones influence armed conflicts, the protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian and human rights law, generating concerns about civilian victims, lack of transparency and lack of accountability. This directly challenges the objective of SDG 16, which promotes peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice, and effective, accountable institutions. When drone operations lack transparency or proper oversight, they undermine the principles of rule of law and institutional accountability that SDG 16 seeks to strengthen.

SDG 9: Although drones are the result of rapid technological advances that improve surveillance and defense, they also raise ethical dilemmas, encourage the militarization of technology and can increase inequalities and conflict risks. This relates to SDG 9, which promotes innovation, resilient infrastructure, and technological advancement, while emphasizing sustainable and responsible development. The expansion of military drone technology demonstrates how innovation can contribute to security but also create new risks if not properly regulated.

SDG 17: Adequate regulation, legal supervision and international cooperation, especially through the UN, are key to establishing common standards, preventing arms racing, limiting proliferation and promoting responsible use of this technology in favor of long-term international stability and security. In this context, SDG 17 is essential, as it calls for strengthened global partnerships and international cooperation to address complex global challenges collectively and ensure that technological progress supports peace rather than conflict.

5.2 Abstract: Military drones, commonly referred to as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), have become an increasingly important tool in international military operations. States use drones for surveillance, intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and targeted strikes, often arguing that they improve operational efficiency and reduce risks to military personnel. Since the early 2000s, drone use has expanded significantly, especially in counterterrorism operations and conflict zones. Their relatively low cost and technological adaptability have also made them accessible to a growing number of states.

Despite their strategic advantages, the use of military drones has raised serious concerns regarding international law and global security. Drone strikes conducted across borders may violate state sovereignty and have led to civilian casualties, generating debates about compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights standards. In addition, the lack of transparency surrounding drone programs complicates accountability and oversight. These concerns have intensified discussions about the need for clearer international regulations and monitoring mechanisms.

The increasing availability of drone technology also raises concerns about proliferation and potential misuse by non-state actors. For DISEC, the challenge lies in addressing these risks while considering the role of drones in modern warfare and maintaining international peace and stability. Balancing technological advancement with ethical responsibility and international cooperation remains a central issue for the international community.

5.3 Historical background: The development of military drones, commonly known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), began with experimental unmanned systems in the early and mid-20th century, primarily used for reconnaissance and target practice. During World War I and World War II, early prototypes were tested, but technological limitations restricted their operational impact. During the Cold War, unmanned systems were further developed for surveillance missions, particularly for intelligence collection in high-risk areas where manned aircraft faced significant danger. However, their strategic importance increased significantly in the

late 1990s with the introduction of more advanced surveillance drones in conflicts such as the Balkans. The turning point came in the early 2000s, when drones were equipped with strike capabilities and incorporated into active combat operations. This marked a major shift in military strategy, as states began relying on remotely operated systems for both intelligence gathering and targeted attacks.

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, drone operations expanded notably in regions such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where they were heavily used in counterterrorism and military campaigns. Cross-border drone strikes were also conducted in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, often aimed at non-state armed groups. These operations represented a new phase in the projection of military power, as drones allowed states to carry out actions beyond their territorial borders without deploying large numbers of ground troops. The use of drones during this period was frequently justified as a tool to increase precision and reduce military casualties, yet it also generated international debate regarding sovereignty and the geographical limits of armed conflict.

Over time, additional countries developed and deployed their own drone programs, accelerating a global trend. Drone use became visible in conflicts in Libya and Syria, where various actors incorporated UAVs into battlefield strategies, as well as in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where drones played a decisive tactical role. The rapid spread of drone technology was facilitated by decreasing production costs, advancements in satellite communication, and the integration of artificial intelligence into targeting systems. As more states invested in domestic drone industries, unmanned systems became central components of modern defense strategies.

The increasing accessibility and affordability of drone technology contributed to its rapid global proliferation, including to regions in North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. This expansion marked a significant transformation in the conduct of modern warfare, shifting traditional military doctrines toward remote engagement and technology-driven operations. The historical evolution of military drones demonstrates how innovation reshaped operational capabilities, altered traditional concepts of sovereignty and battlefield presence, and introduced new dynamics into international security and armed conflict.

5.4 Current situation: The current situation regarding the use of military drones in international operations reflects both rapid technological advancement and growing global concern. Today, drones are widely integrated into the defense strategies of numerous states, serving roles that range from surveillance and intelligence gathering to precision strikes and border monitoring. Their use has expanded beyond traditional counterterrorism operations and is now visible in interstate conflicts, regional disputes, and strategic deterrence policies. In ongoing conflicts such as those in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, drones have played a central operational role, demonstrating their effectiveness in reconnaissance, artillery coordination, and direct attacks. At the same time, the emergence of self-guided munitions and semi-autonomous systems has further transformed modern battlefields.

However, this expansion has intensified debates about legality, accountability, and ethical responsibility. Concerns persist regarding civilian casualties, proportionality in armed conflict, and the transparency of drone programs. The growing development of autonomous features powered by artificial intelligence has raised additional questions about human control in the use of force and the potential erosion of established international humanitarian law principles. Furthermore, the accessibility of drone technology has increased the risk of proliferation, with non-state actors and armed groups acquiring or modifying commercial drones for military purposes. This trend has blurred the lines between conventional warfare and irregular conflict, complicating international security dynamics.

From a global perspective, the situation presents both advantages and risks. On one hand, drones can enhance precision, reduce risks to military personnel, and improve surveillance capabilities. On the other hand, their widespread deployment may contribute to arms races, destabilization, and lowered thresholds for the use of force. In response, discussions within the international community emphasize the need for updated regulatory frameworks, stronger export controls, transparency measures, and confidence-building initiatives. Greater multilateral cooperation, clearer accountability mechanisms, and the establishment of norms governing autonomous weapon systems are frequently proposed as necessary steps to ensure responsible use.

Looking forward, what can be made involves balancing innovation with regulation. Strengthening international dialogue, reinforcing compliance with humanitarian law, and promoting global agreements on the responsible development and deployment of unmanned systems remain central priorities. The challenge today is not only managing how drones are used, but also anticipating how future technological developments could further reshape conflict and international stability. Right to vote guaranteed by such countries, was and is a fundamental step toward a more just and egalitarian society.

5.5 Basic guide on the position of delegations:

5.5.1 Industrialized Countries (G8): Industrialized countries, particularly members of the G8 such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, are among the primary developers, exporters, and operators of advanced military drone technology. Their position on the use of military drones in international operations is generally characterized by a balance between strategic defense interests and support for responsible regulation.

These states consider military drones essential tools for national security, counterterrorism operations, and force protection. They argue that drones enhance operational precision, improve intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and significantly reduce risks to military personnel. Furthermore, they often maintain that, when used in accordance with international humanitarian law, drones may minimize civilian casualties compared to conventional warfare methods.

Regarding cross-border operations, some industrialized countries justify drone strikes under the right to self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, or under the consent of the host state. However, concerns about sovereignty, proportionality, and accountability remain present even within this group, particularly among European states that advocate clearer legal frameworks and stronger oversight mechanisms.

In terms of regulation, industrialized nations generally support export controls, transparency initiatives, and confidence-building measures. Nevertheless, they tend to be cautious about binding international treaties that could restrict military flexibility or

technological innovation. Many of these countries also support discussions on artificial intelligence governance in military systems, provided that meaningful human control is maintained.

5.5.2 Developing Countries: Developing countries, including many states in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and parts of the Middle East, often approach the issue of military drones from the perspective of sovereignty, equality, and international legal integrity. These states emphasize the principle of sovereign equality as established in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter and frequently express strong opposition to unauthorized cross-border drone operations. They highlight concerns about civilian casualties, lack of transparency, and limited accountability mechanisms, arguing that drone warfare may lower the political and strategic threshold for the use of force.

Developing countries often call for clearer international regulations under United Nations supervision. They advocate for stronger oversight mechanisms, independent investigations into alleged violations, and improved transparency in targeting procedures. Additionally, many of these states express concern that the rapid advancement of drone technology widens military inequality between developed and developing nations, potentially destabilizing already fragile regions.

Regarding proliferation, developing countries are particularly concerned about the accessibility of drone technology to non-state actors and armed groups. As a result, they frequently support stricter export controls, enhanced monitoring systems, and greater multilateral cooperation to prevent misuse while ensuring peaceful technological development.

5.5.3 International Institutions: Political-military organizations such as NATO view military drones as legitimate and strategic tools within collective defense frameworks. NATO emphasizes that drone operations must comply with international humanitarian law and principles of proportionality and distinction. The organization supports interoperability among member states and encourages responsible innovation, including the integration of artificial intelligence under meaningful human control. At the same time, NATO expresses concern about the proliferation of drone technology to adversarial states and non-state actors.

Economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank do not directly regulate military technologies, but they recognize the economic consequences of armed conflicts facilitated by emerging technologies. These institutions emphasize that instability caused by prolonged drone-driven conflicts may undermine development, economic stability, and infrastructure resilience, particularly in fragile states.

Within the framework of the United Nations, and specifically in DISEC, discussions focus on arms control, emerging military technologies, international humanitarian law compliance, and the prevention of destabilizing arms races. The UN promotes multilateral dialogue, transparency measures, and confidence-building initiatives. Additionally, the issue of military drones is linked to Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17, emphasizing peace, strong institutions, and international cooperation.

5.5.4 Regional Perspectives:

In Africa, many states emphasize sovereignty and non-intervention principles. While some governments utilize drones for counterterrorism and border security, there is significant concern regarding proliferation, regional destabilization, and the use of drones by armed groups. African states generally support UN-led regulatory frameworks and stronger international cooperation.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations promotes the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. ASEAN member states tend to favor confidence-building measures, dialogue, and gradual regulation rather than strict prohibitions. They are cautious about the militarization of emerging technologies and the risk of regional arms races.

In the Middle East, military drones have become central to both interstate and proxy conflicts. States in the region use drones for surveillance, deterrence, and direct strikes. However, the widespread deployment of drone technology has raised concerns about escalation, proliferation to non-state actors, and long-term instability. Regional positions are often divided between security-driven strategies and calls for international regulation.

The European Union supports stronger export controls, ethical frameworks for artificial intelligence in military systems, and strict compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. The European Union promotes multilateral agreements and greater transparency in the use of armed drones.

In Eastern Europe outside the European Union, the use of drones has become highly relevant in active conflicts. States in this region often emphasize defensive necessity and deterrence. Their position typically prioritizes national survival and strategic balance, sometimes placing less emphasis on restrictive international regulation.

In North America, the United States has been a pioneer in developing and operationalizing armed drone strategies, often defending their use under counterterrorism and self-defense doctrines. Meanwhile, Canada generally adopts a more cautious approach, emphasizing transparency, accountability, and adherence to international humanitarian law.

Latin America and the Caribbean generally emphasize non-intervention, peaceful dispute resolution, and strong multilateral frameworks under the United Nations. While most states in the region are not major international drone strike operators, they express concern about militarization and support clearer international legal standards.

In Oceania, Australia supports lawful and strategic drone use within collective defense frameworks, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. It emphasizes deterrence, technological advancement, and alignment with international humanitarian law principles.

5.6 Main points to discuss. One of the central challenges surrounding the use of military drones in international operations is ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights standards. The use of drones in cross-border strikes raises concerns about state sovereignty, proportionality, and the protection of civilians. Civilian casualties, difficulties in independent investigations, and limited transparency complicate accountability and weaken trust

in international legal frameworks. Addressing how existing laws apply to rapidly evolving military technologies remains a significant issue for the international community.

Another major concern is the lack of transparency and oversight in many drone programs. Decision-making processes, targeting criteria, and operational details are often classified, which limits public scrutiny and international evaluation. This creates challenges in determining responsibility when violations occur and may undermine confidence between states. Strengthening reporting mechanisms and improving accountability systems while balancing national security interests is a key issue that requires multilateral discussion.

The proliferation of drone technology also presents serious security risks. As production costs decrease and commercial technology becomes more accessible, both states and non-state actors can acquire or modify drones for military purposes. The potential misuse of drones by armed groups or terrorist organizations increases instability and complicates conflict dynamics. Preventing uncontrolled spread while allowing legitimate technological development requires stronger export controls, monitoring mechanisms, and international cooperation.

The growing integration of artificial intelligence and autonomous capabilities into drone systems introduces additional ethical and strategic concerns. Questions arise regarding the appropriate level of human control in the use of force and the risks associated with automated decision-making in combat environments. Delegating lethal authority to autonomous systems challenges existing legal and moral frameworks and may have long-term consequences for global security.

Finally, the widespread deployment of military drones may alter the threshold for the use of force and contribute to regional arms races. While drones can improve precision and reduce risks to military personnel, their accessibility and efficiency may make military action more politically and strategically attractive. Balancing technological innovation with responsible regulation and collective security measures remains essential to maintaining international peace and stability.

6. Topic A Questionnaire

1. How does the use of military drones in cross-border operations challenge state sovereignty and compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law?

2. In what ways does the lack of transparency in drone programs affect accountability and trust between states within the international community?

3. How does the proliferation of drone technology increase the risk of misuse by non-state actors, and what measures can be implemented to prevent this?

4. What are the ethical and legal implications of integrating artificial intelligence and autonomous capabilities into military drone systems?

5. How can international cooperation and regulation, particularly through the United Nations and DISEC, balance technological innovation with the need to maintain global peace and security?

7. Topic B: Prevention of bioterrorism and control of high-security laboratories

7.1 Linked SDG's

SDG 3: The prevention of bioterrorism is directly linked to SDG 3, which seeks to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. Biological attacks can cause widespread disease outbreaks, overwhelm health systems, generate panic, and produce long-term economic

and social disruption. Strengthening biosecurity systems, improving laboratory safety protocols, and enhancing early detection mechanisms are essential components of protecting public health. The regulation of high-security laboratories ensures that dangerous pathogens are handled responsibly, reducing the risk of accidental leaks or intentional misuse. Therefore, biosecurity contributes directly to global health resilience and preparedness against biological threats.

SDG 16: Bioterrorism represents a serious threat to international peace and security. SDG 16 promotes peaceful societies, access to justice, and strong, accountable institutions. Effective prevention of biological threats requires robust legal frameworks, transparent oversight systems, and strong national and international institutions capable of monitoring compliance with biosecurity standards. Weak governance, corruption, or lack of regulatory enforcement can increase the risk of biological materials being diverted for malicious purposes. Strengthening institutional capacity and international legal mechanisms, including compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), directly supports the objectives of SDG 16.

SDG 17: Biological threats do not respect borders. The prevention of bioterrorism depends on strong international cooperation, information sharing, scientific collaboration, and coordinated emergency responses. SDG 17 emphasizes global partnerships to address complex global challenges. Cooperation among states, international organizations, research institutions, and health agencies is essential to standardize biosecurity measures, support developing countries with technical assistance, and enhance global surveillance systems. Without multilateral cooperation, biological risks may expand unchecked, undermining global stability.

7.2 Abstract: Bioterrorism refers to the intentional release of biological agents such as viruses, bacteria, or toxins to cause harm to populations, economies, or the environment. Advances in biotechnology, genetic engineering, and laboratory research have significantly improved global capacity to treat and prevent diseases. However, these same advancements present dual-use risks, meaning that research intended for peaceful and medical purposes can potentially be misused for harmful objectives.

High-security laboratories, including Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) and Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) facilities, play a crucial role in researching dangerous pathogens in order to develop vaccines,

treatments, and defensive strategies. Despite their importance, these laboratories also represent potential vulnerabilities if safety standards, oversight, and regulatory controls are insufficient. Accidental leaks, unauthorized access, or deliberate misuse of biological materials could have catastrophic consequences.

The international community has attempted to address these risks through agreements such as the Biological Weapons Convention. Nevertheless, enforcement and verification challenges persist. DISEC must therefore consider how to strengthen global biosecurity frameworks while preserving scientific innovation and international cooperation.

7.3 Historical background: The use of biological agents as weapons has historical roots dating back centuries, when contaminated materials were allegedly used to spread disease among enemy populations. However, the modern development of biological warfare emerged during the 20th century, particularly during World War I and World War II. Several states explored biological weapons programs, recognizing the potential of pathogens to cause mass casualties.

During the Cold War, biological weapons research expanded significantly. Although international condemnation grew, some states maintained offensive biological programs in secrecy. The growing recognition of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of biological warfare led to diplomatic efforts to prohibit such weapons. In 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was adopted, prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. The Convention entered into force in 1975 and became a central pillar of global biosecurity efforts.

Despite the BWC's importance, it lacks a formal verification mechanism, making enforcement dependent on trust, transparency, and voluntary compliance. Concerns about compliance emerged in the late 20th century when secret biological programs were uncovered after the Cold War.

The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States marked a turning point in global awareness of bioterrorism threats. Letters containing anthrax spores were sent through the mail, causing deaths and widespread fear. This incident demonstrated that even limited quantities of biological material could create large-scale psychological and economic disruption.

In the 21st century, rapid advances in biotechnology, including gene editing technologies and synthetic biology, have further transformed the biosecurity landscape. While these innovations hold great promise for medicine and agriculture, they also increase the accessibility of biological research tools. The expansion of high-security laboratories worldwide has improved disease research capacity, but it has also intensified debates regarding oversight, transparency, and risk management.

The COVID-19 pandemic further underscored the global vulnerability to biological threats, even when naturally occurring. Although the pandemic was not a bioterrorism event, it revealed weaknesses in preparedness systems, supply chains, and international coordination, highlighting the importance of strengthening biosecurity frameworks.

7.4 Current situation: The current global situation regarding bioterrorism prevention reflects both scientific progress and growing concern. Advances in biotechnology have enabled rapid vaccine development, improved disease detection systems, and enhanced global surveillance networks. At the same time, the dual-use nature of biological research continues to raise security challenges.

High-security laboratories are now present in many regions, conducting research on highly infectious pathogens such as Ebola, Marburg, and other dangerous viruses. While these facilities are essential for global health preparedness, they require strict biosafety and biosecurity standards to prevent accidental releases or unauthorized access. Variations in regulatory capacity among countries create uneven levels of protection, increasing global risk.

Another significant concern is the absence of a legally binding verification system under the Biological Weapons Convention. Although states are obligated not to develop biological weapons, monitoring compliance remains limited. Efforts to strengthen transparency measures and confidence-building mechanisms continue, yet consensus among member states is often difficult to achieve.

The proliferation of biotechnology knowledge and equipment also increases the possibility that non-state actors could attempt to acquire or engineer biological agents. While large-scale biological attacks remain complex and technically challenging, smaller-scale incidents could still

cause severe disruption. The integration of digital technologies and artificial intelligence into biological research further complicates oversight and risk assessment.

In response to these challenges, the international community has emphasized strengthening national legislation, enhancing laboratory accreditation systems, and expanding international cooperation. Capacity-building initiatives aim to assist developing countries in improving biosafety standards and emergency response systems. International organizations encourage information sharing, joint training programs, and coordinated response strategies to biological incidents.

Balancing scientific freedom with security considerations remains a central challenge. Excessive restrictions could hinder medical innovation and global health progress, while insufficient regulation could increase the risk of misuse. Therefore, the international community must pursue a comprehensive approach that includes stronger institutional frameworks, enhanced transparency, multilateral dialogue, and responsible scientific governance.

Looking forward, preventing bioterrorism requires sustained commitment to global partnerships, improved monitoring systems, stronger compliance mechanisms, and ethical responsibility in scientific research. The objective is not only to prevent deliberate biological attacks but also to minimize accidental risks and ensure that biotechnology contributes to peace, development, and global stability.

7.5 Basic Guide on the Position of Delegations

7.5.1 Industrialized Countries (G8): Industrialized countries, particularly members of the G8 such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, possess some of the most advanced biotechnology sectors and the highest concentration of high-security laboratories, including Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) and Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) facilities. Their position on the prevention of bioterrorism and the control of high-security laboratories is generally centered on balancing national security, scientific innovation, and global responsibility.

These states strongly support the prohibition of biological weapons and reaffirm their commitment to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). They emphasize the importance of

maintaining strict biosafety and biosecurity standards within high-containment laboratories to prevent accidental releases, unauthorized access, or misuse of dangerous pathogens.

Industrialized countries often advocate for strengthening national legislation, laboratory accreditation systems, and oversight mechanisms. At the same time, they are cautious about establishing intrusive international verification systems that could compromise sensitive research or national sovereignty. Instead, they tend to favor transparency measures, voluntary confidence-building mechanisms, and peer-review processes.

Additionally, these states stress the importance of scientific freedom and the continued advancement of biotechnology for medical, agricultural, and public health purposes. They argue that excessive restrictions could hinder innovation, vaccine development, and global disease preparedness. Therefore, their general approach is to reinforce security frameworks without limiting legitimate research and international scientific cooperation.

7.5.2 Third World or Developing Countries: Developing countries approach the issue of bioterrorism and high-security laboratory regulation from the perspective of global equity, capacity-building, and institutional strengthening. Many developing states express concern that uneven regulatory capacities create vulnerabilities in global biosecurity. They emphasize that weak infrastructure, insufficient funding, and limited technical expertise may increase the risk of accidental releases or security breaches in certain regions. As a result, they advocate for greater international assistance, technology transfer, and capacity-building programs to strengthen biosafety standards worldwide.

These countries strongly support multilateral cooperation under United Nations frameworks and frequently call for clearer international monitoring mechanisms within the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention. Some developing states advocate for stronger verification and inspection systems to ensure compliance by all parties, arguing that trust alone is insufficient to guarantee global security.

At the same time, developing countries are cautious about measures that may restrict access to biotechnology for peaceful purposes. They emphasize that biosecurity policies must not create barriers to medical research, pharmaceutical production, or disease prevention efforts in

developing regions. Their position seeks to balance strict control of dangerous pathogens with equitable access to scientific progress.

7.5.3 International Institutions: Within the framework of the United Nations, and particularly in DISEC, discussions on bioterrorism focus on strengthening international legal norms, improving compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, and enhancing global coordination in the face of biological threats.

The Biological Weapons Convention remains the central international instrument prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. However, its lack of a legally binding verification mechanism continues to generate debate among member states. The UN promotes transparency, confidence-building measures, and multilateral dialogue to reinforce compliance and prevent misuse of biological research.

The World Health Organization plays a crucial role in global health preparedness, disease surveillance, and emergency response coordination. Although it does not regulate military matters, its expertise in outbreak detection and response contributes significantly to preventing and mitigating biological threats, whether intentional or accidental.

Economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund emphasize the economic consequences of biological crises. Large-scale outbreaks, whether natural or deliberate, can severely disrupt global supply chains, healthcare systems, and economic stability. Therefore, these institutions support investment in resilient health systems and global preparedness mechanisms.

International institutions generally stress that preventing bioterrorism requires strong governance, transparency, international cooperation, and harmonized biosecurity standards across regions, in alignment with Sustainable Development Goals 3, 16, and 17.

7.5.4 Regional Perspectives: In Africa, many states prioritize strengthening laboratory infrastructure and biosafety standards through international assistance and regional cooperation. While most African countries do not possess extensive BSL-4 facilities, there is growing awareness

of the need to improve disease surveillance systems and emergency response capabilities. African states generally support stronger international cooperation and capacity-building initiatives.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations promotes regional collaboration in health security and emergency preparedness. ASEAN member states emphasize information-sharing mechanisms, joint training programs, and coordinated responses to biological incidents. They generally support stronger transparency measures but remain cautious about intrusive inspection systems that may affect sovereignty.

In the Middle East, concerns about regional instability, conflict, and non-state actors increase the perceived risk of biological material misuse. States in the region often emphasize national security measures, stricter domestic control over laboratories, and counterterrorism frameworks. However, regional divisions may complicate consensus on international verification mechanisms.

The European Union supports strong biosafety regulations, standardized laboratory accreditation systems, and enhanced transparency within the Biological Weapons Convention framework. The European Union often advocates for strengthening compliance mechanisms and improving coordination between health and security institutions.

In Eastern Europe outside the European Union, biosecurity discussions are influenced by geopolitical tensions and concerns about transparency and trust. These states may prioritize national control and security measures while participating in international confidence-building initiatives.

In North America, the United States maintains an extensive network of high-security laboratories and emphasizes national biosecurity legislation, research oversight, and biodefense preparedness. While supportive of the Biological Weapons Convention, it has historically expressed reservations regarding binding verification mechanisms. Canada similarly supports strong biosafety standards and international cooperation, often emphasizing transparency and multilateral dialogue.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, most states prioritize peaceful scientific development and regional health cooperation. These countries generally advocate for stronger international

oversight mechanisms, enhanced information sharing, and capacity-building programs to improve biosafety and prevent the proliferation of biological materials to non-state actors.

In Oceania, Australia plays an active role in export controls and non-proliferation initiatives. It supports strong regulatory frameworks, international cooperation, and responsible scientific governance to prevent biological threats while promoting innovation.

7.6 Points to discuss: One of the main challenges in preventing bioterrorism and regulating high-security laboratories is ensuring compliance with international law and the Biological Weapons Convention while allowing legitimate scientific research to continue. The dual-use nature of biological research makes it difficult to distinguish between peaceful innovation and potential misuse. Weak regulatory systems, limited oversight, and gaps in enforcement increase the risks of accidental releases or intentional diversion of dangerous pathogens.

Another significant concern is the lack of standardized transparency and monitoring across countries. Differences in biosafety regulations, reporting procedures, and laboratory accreditation create inconsistencies in global protection levels. Limited information-sharing about incidents or security breaches can weaken trust and collective security. Strengthening reporting mechanisms and accountability systems—while respecting national sovereignty—requires effective multilateral cooperation.

The growing accessibility of biotechnology also raises proliferation risks. As equipment, expertise, and materials become more widely available, non-state actors could attempt to misuse biological agents. Preventing this requires stronger export controls, coordinated international regulations, and improved monitoring mechanisms, without restricting peaceful scientific advancement.

Emerging technologies such as synthetic biology and artificial intelligence further complicate biosecurity governance. While they enhance medical and research capabilities, they also create new ethical and regulatory challenges. Ensuring responsible innovation, maintaining human oversight, and reinforcing compliance mechanisms are essential to reducing long-term security risks.

Finally, unequal levels of preparedness and regulatory capacity among states create vulnerabilities in global biosecurity. Strengthening international partnerships, capacity–building initiatives, and coordinated response systems remains crucial to preventing bioterrorism and safeguarding international stability.

8. Topic B Questionnaire

1. How will your delegation strengthen national biosecurity systems to prevent the intentional misuse of biological agents while ensuring that scientific research and public health innovation are not unnecessarily restricted?

2. What measures has your delegation implemented to regulate and monitor high–security laboratories (BSL–3 and BSL–4), and how does it ensure transparency, accountability, and compliance with international standards?

3. According to your delegation, should stronger international verification and inspection mechanisms be established under the Biological Weapons Convention, and how would these measures balance national sovereignty with global security?

4. What strategies does your delegation propose to prevent the proliferation of biological materials, technologies, and expertise to non–state actors, including terrorist organizations, while maintaining international scientific cooperation?

5. How will your delegation promote international partnerships, information–sharing mechanisms, and rapid response systems to strengthen global preparedness and coordinated action in the event of a biological threat or bioterrorism incident?

9. List of summoned delegations

1. Afghanistan
2. Australia
3. Brazil
4. Canada
5. France
6. Germany
7. India
8. Indonesia
9. Iran
10. Israel
11. Japan
12. Mexico
13. Netherlands
14. Nigeria
15. Pakistan
16. People's Republic of China
17. Russian Federation
18. South Africa
19. Sweden
20. Switzerland
21. Syria
22. Turkey
23. Turkmenistan
24. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
25. United States of America

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11. Rules of procedure

1. **LEGALITY**. These rules of procedure are the unique protocol criterion of this simulation. The ULSACMUN's Organizing Committee will have the final statement if there were any kind of misunderstanding or controversy about their meaning or application.

2. **OFFICIAL LANGUAGE**. English will be the official language, at any time during the sessions, in the committees mentioned in the heading of this document.

3. **ORGANIZING COMMITTEE.** The Organizing Committee is composed by the Executive Committee (Secretary General, Sub- Secretaries and Academic Advisor), and by each committee's Chair (President, Conference Officer and Moderator).

4. **STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARIAT**. The Secretary General, or a member of the Organizing Committee designated by them may, at any time, make either written or oral statements to the Committees. Those statements, for the purposes of this simulation, will be definitive.

5. **DELEGATIONS**. During each session, in any given committee, each delegation may be composed of one and only one delegate, representing just one state/company/organization/ representation, and having the right to cast just one vote.[1]

6. **OBSERVERS**. They shall be considered as observers those who represent a state/ company/organization that does not count on the Member status in the committee. Observers do not have the right to cast a vote during amendments and resolutions. However, they can participate during the debate with the same rights of any member, and they must be recognized by the Chair of the committee.

7. **EXTERNAL VISITORS (teachers, faculties, relatives and friends)**. External visitors must have the authorization of the Organizing Committee to be allowed to watch the debate. Under no circumstances can an external visitor interfere, in any way, during the simulation.

8. **POSITION PAPER/ QUESTIONNAIRES:** As part of his/her participation, each delegate must elaborate and deliver, to the Chair of the committee, a Position Paper document with the pertinent data

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[1] In some cases, a delegate can have a "double delegation". That will imply to represent a different state/company/ organization/advisory in each of the topics of the Agenda. In those cases, the delegates will adjust their position papers and questionnaires to fulfill with the requirements of this simulation.

and the official position of the state/company/organization represented. The delegates/representatives must also answer and deliver the questionnaires included in the Handbooks. Delegates must deliver their position paper in the designated due date established by the Organizing Committee and a printed copy during the first session of the simulation. Delegates/representatives that fail to comply with these requirements may be granted with a warning.

9. **USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES**: The use of electronic devices (laptops, tablets, cellphones, etc.) is permitted if the Chair allows it.

10. **POWERS OF THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE**. The authority during any given session of any given committee will fall on the Chair members, with the following precisions:

a) The highest level of authority is with the *President,* being her/his decisions unappealable. The President will declare the session opening or closing and can also suggest procedures that in her/his opinion will contribute to the fluency of debate.

b) The *Moderator* has the function of directing the debate, granting the word to delegates, and helping debate to be fluid and effective. In the absence of the President, the Moderator will assume the duties of the presidency.

c) The *Conference Officer* will help with President and Moderator tasks, during formal sessions. He/she will also register votes, resolve any inconvenience that may occur to delegates, and will help with communication between them through written messages, and personally.

Any member of the Chair will be able to assist delegates with the possible course of the debate and/or any other matters related to this simulation.

11. **MAJORITY CRITERIA**. There are 2 types of criteria to consider in a voting procedure. In both cases the totality of the present delegations/representations, present and approved are considered to participate in the session, excepting those occasions in which only members can vote. The use of each specific majority depends on the situation:

a) *Simple majority:* Implies 50% +1 (fifty percent plus one) of present delegations/representations. It is used in almost every procedure to vote, except for the closure of debate.

b) *Qualified majority:* 2/3 (two thirds) of present delegations/representations. To be used in case of voting on closing debate to pass into voting a resolution or amendment.

12. **QUORUM**. To declare a debate session officially opened, the President has to declare the existence of *quorum.* To do so, at least a simple majority of the total delegates/representatives summoned must be present. This requirement is also needed when voting for an amendment or a resolution.

13. **COURTESY**. All delegates/representatives must show, in every moment, respect and courtesy toward the Chair and all present delegates/representatives.

14. **DIPLOMATIC NOTES**. Unless the Committee is on the Open Floor or in any type of Caucus, delegates/representatives must maintain all communication exclusively in written form, through Diplomatic Notes. These notes must be sent through the members of the Chair of the Committee, who may be assisted by other members of the Organizing Committee of ULSACMUN. The improper use of Diplomatic Notes may cause the delegates/representatives to be subject to a warning.

15. **WARNINGS**. In case of breaking any rule, the Chair or any member of the Organizing Committee can give a warning to any delegate. When a delegate/ representative is given two warnings in the same session, he/she must leave the session, and he/she won't be able to come back until the next one. If the delegate/representative receives three warnings during the model, her/his participation will be suspended permanently.

16. **OPEN FLOOR**. It is considered an open floor only when the Moderator or the President has expressed it to the committee. The floor must be open to establish any motion of procedure or point of parliamentary inquiry.

17. **AGENDA**. The first action of the committee will be to establish the order of the Agenda. To do so, delegates/representatives must follow the next steps:

a) A motion should bje made to put a topic first on the agenda. This motion requires a second.

b) An extraordinaire Speakers List of two delegates/representatives for and two delegates against the motion will be established and each one of those four delegates will state his/her arguments in a speech of no longer than 30 seconds.

c) Automatically, after the speeches mentioned in the previous point, a voting will be made to open the debate with the proposed topic. If the voting has a positive simple majority, the debate will begin with the proposed topic. Otherwise, automatically the debate will begin with the other topic of the Agenda.

d) A motion to proceed to the second topic area will only be in order after the Committee has adopted or rejected a resolution on the first topic. If a resolution on the first topic is accepted, the process to begin with the second topic will be automatic. In case the resolution is rejected, the motion to proceed to a second topic is open to debate, to the extent of one speaker in favor and one against. This motion requires a vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting to pass. If the motion fails, the Committee will continue in the first topic, in the process of revising or amending the proposed resolution.

18. **SPEAKERS LIST**. Once the Committee has chosen the topic to begin the debate, the only acceptable motion will be the one to open the Speakers' List. This motion needs to be seconded; however, it doesn't need to be voted.

The speakers list will be opened with the delegations who have requested it. After that, any country can ask for its inclusion on the list by raising the placard and asking for a motion to be added or by a diplomatic note addressed to the Chair.

By decision of ULSACMUN's Organizing Committee, the Speakers List will be exclusively used for the time needed for the members of the Committee to present, in a unique participation per delegate/representative, their official position towards the discussed topic. After that has been accomplished, the Chair will have the power to manage the rest of the time assigned to the topic, through Simple and Moderated Caucuses.

19. **SPEECHES**. Delegates/representatives cannot address the committee without authorization of the Chair. Any Chair member can call a speaker to come to order if he/she is deviating from the topic of the discussion. Speeches must be made in such a way that it's clear that the delegates represent the position of a nation/enterprise/organization. That is why delegates must abstain in using the *first person* when establishing their speeches. Failing to fulfill this requirement may cause the delegate to earn a warning.

20. **SPEECHES TIME LIMIT**. The Chair will establish the time that every delegate must speak, inside a margin of 10 seconds as minimum and 3 minutes as maximum time. The Moderator will call the delegate to order if he/she exceeds the time limit to speak. A time limit change can also be proposed by any delegate; it must be seconded and approved by simple majority. The President can call out of order this motion and his/her decision will be unappealable.

21.   **YIELDS**. A delegate/representative who has been accepted to speak about a topic on the Speakers' List must yield his/her time in one of the ways shown below. The delegate/representative must tell his/her decision to the Chair when he/she finishes his/her speech.

a)   To another delegate/representative: The other delegate/representative can use the remaining time but can't yield it again. If the one that is receiving the time doesn't accept it, the yielder can be granted with a warning.

*b)   To other delegates'/*representatives' *questions:* The delegates/representatives that will be asking the questions will be chosen by the Moderator and can only ask one question (with the right to a follow-up question). Time will be discounted from the answers of the speaker.

c) To the Chair: This option implies that the remaining time can no longer be used in any way. This option must be used even if the time has expired completely.

IMPORTANT NOTE: If the delegate/representative does not yield his/her remaining time in any of the above options, the Chair can give a maximum of two delegates the right to comment about the speaker's speech, and these comments can't be replied to by the speaker.

22. **EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF QUESTIONS**. As a decision of ULSACMUN's Organizing Committee, to keep the fluency of the debate, this resource won't be available during this simulation. The opportunity to question another delegate/representative will be present during Simple and Moderated Caucus.

23. **POINT OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.** Whenever a delegate/representative experiences personal discomfort which impairs his/her ability to participate in the proceedings; he/she may rise to a Point of Personal Privilege to request discomfort to be corrected. While a Point of Personal Privilege may interrupt a speaker, delegates/representatives should use this power with the utmost discretion, to avoid being granted with a warning for the abuse of it.

24.   **POINT OF ORDER.** During the discussion of any matter, a delegate/representative may rise to a Point of Order to indicate an instance of improper parliamentary procedure. The Point of Order will be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these rules of procedure. The President may rule "out of order" those points that are dilatory or improper; such a decision is unappealable. A delegate/representative rising to a Point of Order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion. A Point of Order may only interrupt a speaker if the speech itself is not following proper parliamentary procedure.

25. **POINT OF PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY.** When the floor is open, a delegate/representative may rise to a Point of Parliamentary Inquiry to ask the members of the Chair a question regarding the rules of procedure. A Point of Parliamentary Inquiry may never interrupt a speaker. Delegates/representatives with substantive questions about the topic should not rise to this Point but should rather approach the committee during caucus or in written form through a Diplomatic Note.

26. **RIGHT OF REPLY.** A delegate/representative whose personal or national integrity has been harmed by another delegate may request a Right of Reply through a Diplomatic Note addressed to the Chair. The Chair's decision whether to grant the Right of Reply is unappealable. A delegate/representative who has been granted a Right of Reply will not address the committee, and she/he will be granted a warning. A Right of Reply to a Right of Reply is out of order.

27. **SIMPLE CAUCUS (OPEN DEBATE).** A motion to open a simple caucus will be in order at any time when the floor is open. To open a simple caucus, the delegate/representative making the motion must briefly explain its purpose and specify a time limit for the caucus that, under no circumstances, will exceed thirty minutes. The motion will immediately be put to a vote. A simple majority of the present members is required for passage. The President may rule the motion as out of order and his/her decision is unappealable.

28. **MODERATED CAUCUS.** In a moderated caucus, the Chair will call on delegates/representatives to speak at his/her discretion, always under the authority of the Moderator.

A motion for a moderated caucus is in order at any time when the floor is open. However, the President may rule the motion as out of order and her/his decision is unappealable. The delegate making the motion must specify a time limit for the caucus, not to exceed twenty minutes. Once raised, the motion will be voted, with a simple majority of present members required for passage.

All speeches during the moderated caucus must be brief to promote the participation of all delegates, with a limit time of 2 minutes. The Chair can interrupt speeches that exceed the established limit, and that decision will be considered as definitive.

Also, with the purpose of facilitating substantive debate at critical junctures in the discussion, the Organizing Committee of ULSACMUN has decided to *allow direct contact and questioning between delegates/representatives*. In the same sense, delegates/representatives must abstain to establish any Point of Order related to the use of the first person in the speeches. That resource will be exclusive to the Chair, which could grant a warning to delegates/representatives that persist in that kind of behavior.

29. **ROUND ROBIN**: Delegates/representatives may propose the motion of a round robin during the time of the debate. During this time, *all* delegates/ representatives present in the forum must speak for a maximum of 1 minute on the current topic, the order of participation will follow the list of delegates/representatives managed by the Chair. Delegates have the right to pass during their turn in the Round Robin.

30. **APPROVAL COMMISSION**. A working paper or a draft resolution must be first revised by the Approval Commission, which will be composed by the President and the Conference Officer of each Committee. This Approval Commission will answer directly to the Secretary General and might suggest modifications of form, but not of content. Eventually any member of the Executive Committee may be part of the Approval Commission.

31. **WORKING PAPER/MINUTE**. A working paper/minute is a document in which the main ideas of solution are exposed. It is the background of a resolution paper/treaty. Working papers/minutes follow a very simple format (Watch the attachment: Sample Working Paper) and, even though they are not official documents, they do require the signature of at least 1/3 of present delegates/representatives and of the Approval Commission to be presented and discussed. A working paper/minute that doesn't present these requirements cannot be officially presented for its discussion.

32. **RESOLUTION PAPER/TREATY**. Every Resolution Paper/Treaty should include solutions to the topic the committee is discussing. A member of the Approval Commission must sign the Resolution Paper/Treaty, and this should be signed by at least 1/3 of the present members and follow the appropriate format (Watch the attachment: Sample Resolution). Once the Resolution Paper/Treaty is approved by the Approval Commission it will be presented to the committee so they can debate about it. No Resolution Paper/Treaty written before the simulation can be presented nor debated. A Resolution/Treaty can only be presented when most of the speakers tell their opinion about the topic. The Chair will invite two delegates that, in 3 minutes maximum, should read the document.

32. **AMENDMENTS.** Delegates may amend any Resolution/Treaty which has been introduced. An amendment must have the approval of the Approval Commission and the signatures of at least 1/3 of the present members to be read and discussed. Amendments to amendments are out order; however, an amendment part of a resolution may be further amended. Preambulatory phrases may not be amended.

The final vote on an amendment is procedural: all present members must vote. An approved amendment may be introduced when the floor is open. The President will recognize two speakers

against the motion to close debate, and a vote of two-thirds is required for closure. Amendments need a simple majority to pass.

33. **CLOSURE OF DEBATE.** Being the floor open, a delegate may propose a motion to close debate on the substantive or procedural matter under discussion. The President may, subject to appeal, rule such a motion dilatory. When closure of debate is proposed, the President may recognize up to two speakers against the motion. No speaker in favor of the motion will be recognized. Closure of debate requires the support of two-thirds of the members present. If the Committee is in favor of closure, the Moderator will declare the closure of the debate, and all resolutions and amendments on the floor will be brought to an immediate Roll-Call voting.

34. **ROLL-CALL VOTING.** After debate is closed on any topic, any delegate may propose a motion to begin a roll-call voting. In a roll call vote, the President will call countries in alphabetical order, to express their vote in three separated rounds:

a) *First round*: Delegates may vote "Yes," "No," "Abstain," or "Pass." A delegate who does not pass may request the right to explain his/her vote.

b) *Second round:* Delegates/representatives who asked for a right of explanation during the first round must explain their vote in a brief speech of no more than 30 seconds. Also, delegates/representatives who passed during the first round of the roll call must vote during the second round. The same delegate may not request the right to explain his/her vote.

c) *Third round:* The President will call for any reconsiderations of vote.

Note: Delegates/ representatives under the *status* of "observers" won't be considered for the roll call voting. However, they will be allowed to stay in the room.

35. **SESSION CLOSURE**. When the floor is open, a delegate may propose a motion to close the session until the next session or the definitive closure. A simple majority of the present members is required for passage. The President may rule the motion as out of order and her/his decision is unappealable.

These rules were revised and approved in March 2026 by:

Ramón Hurtado Calzada and Luis Mario Pinkus Ramírez
Secretary Generals of ULSACMUN 2026

Mariana Leticia Benítez Caballero and María Fernanda Olvera Dueñas
Subsecretarias de Protocol Subsecretary of ULSACMUN 2026

LRI. Luis Humberto Nava Navarrete
Academic Advisor of ULSACMUN 2026

12. About the Working Papers

Structure of a Working Paper/Minute:

a) HEADING: The title should be centered, in capital letters, above the main body of the Working Paper. The title can be as simple as "WORKING PAPER". On the left margin and two lines below the title should be the Committee, the Topic name, and the Sponsors of the working paper.

b) BODY: The Working Paper is written in the format of a list of concrete, detailed, with the following rules:

• The list of points is preceded by a short introduction phrase such as: "We are convinced that the solution to this topic must be based in the following points":

• The points of list should be clearly numbered. Those numbers should be mentioned when presenting the approved Working Paper to the Committee, this to facilitate both the hearing and discussion of its content.

• All points should be thought up to help the committee find a solution to the topic. In this sense there should be propositional, positive points. Also, these points should be as concrete and detailed as possible.

• All points included should be well drafted, paying special attention to their grammar and spelling.

NOTE: As stated in Article 31 of the Rules of Procedure, a Working Paper/Minute requires the signature of 1/3 of present delegates and of the Approval Commission to be presented and discussed by the Committee.

SAMPLE WORKING PAPER

Committee: Security Council

Topic: Crisis in Burundi

Sponsors: Norway, Mexico and Russian Federation

The sponsors of this working paper are convinced that the solution to this topic must be based in the following points:

1. The coup d'état is to be identified as the main cause of the sudden and violent interruption of the democratic process in Burundi.

2. It is necessary to realize the pertinent legal reforms.

3. An immediate cease fire is urgent, as well as the return of all armed forces to their headquarters.

4. It is also mandatory an immediate restoration of democracy and of a constitutional regime.

5. Support to the peace efforts realized by the UN Secretary General, the African Union and the countries in the region, as well as promoting an ordered return to constitutional regime and the respect to democratic institutions in Burundi.

6. Acknowledgement of the special envoy of the UN Secretary General to the zone.

7. Emergency humanitarian aid to Burundi (from either member of the UN or NGO's).

8. To keep the debate, open at the Security Council until a real and effective solution to this topic is reached.

13. About the Resolution projects

STRUCTURE OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:

a) HEADING: The title should be centered, in capital letters, above the main body of the resolution. The title can be as simple as "DRAFT RESOLUTION". On the left margin and two lines below the title should be the committee and topic name.

NOTE: There are no sponsors of a resolution. The signatures are only there to show that the committee wants to discuss the resolution. The names of "sponsors" should not be included.

b) BODY: The resolution is written in the format of a long sentence, with the following rules:

• The resolution begins with The General Assembly for all GA committees and with The Economic and Security Council for all ECOSOC committees. The Specialized Agencies use their own names as the introductory line. The rest of the resolution consists of clauses with the first word of each clause underlined.

• The next section, consisting of Pre-ambulatory Clauses, describes the problem being addressed, recalls past actions taken, explains the purpose of the resolution, and offers support for the operative clauses that follow each clause in the preamble beings with an underlined word and ends with a comma.

• Operative Clauses are numbered and state the action to be taken by the body. These clauses all begin with present tense active verbs, which are generally stronger words than those used in the Preamble. Each operative clause is followed by a semi-colon except the last, which ends with a period.

SAMPLE RESOLUTION

Committee: Science and Technology Commission (ECOSOC)

Topic: Free flow of information.

1) The Economic and Security Council:

2)

3) *Recalling* its Resolution A/36/89 of 16 December 1981, "The Declaration on

4) Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to

5) Peace and International Understanding,"

6) *Recalling also* Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

7) "Everyone has the right to receive and impart information and ideas through any

8) media and regardless of frontiers,"

9) *Recognizing* that the problem of news flows imbalance is that two-way

10) information among countries of a region is either non-existent or insufficient

11) information exchanged between regions of the world is inadequate,

12) *Realizing* the need for all Sovereign Nations to maintain their integrity and still

13) play an active role in the international system.

14)

15) Proposes the following points:

16)

17) **1) Recommends** that a three-level information interchange system be

18) established on the National, Regional, and international levels to ameliorate

19) the current problems of news flow imbalance, with the three-level system

20) operating as follows:

21) a) Each region's member nations will report their national information and

22) receive information of other nations in their region from the regional level 23) of this interchange system.

24) b) Nations will decide the character of the news flow media best suited to the 25) need of their sovereign territory, be this printed, audio, or audio-visual.

26) c) Regional News Gathering Agencies will serve to gather information from the

27) nations in their region, and these boards will have no editorial discretion and

28) will serve to forward all information to the International Board.

29) d) Each regional agency will be composed of representatives from every

30) member nation of the region.

31) e) The primary function of the International Board will be to translate

32) information accumulated from the regional news gathering agencies.

33) f) The secondary purpose will be to transmit all information gathered back to

34) the member nations via the regional news gathering agencies;

35) **2) Urges** the establishment of the University of International Communications,

36) with main branch in Geneva, Switzerland, and additional branches located in 37) each of the regions, to pursue the following aims:

38) a) The University and branches will be established with the express purpose of

39) bringing together world views and facilitating the transfer of technology;

40) b) All member nations of the United Nations will be equally represented at the

41) University.

42) c) Incentives will be offered to students of journalism and communications at

43) the University to return to their countries to teach upon completion of

44) instruction;

45) d) The instructors of the regional education centers will be comprised of

46) multipartisan coalition of educators from throughout the world.

47) **3) Calls** for the continued use of funds from the International Program for the

48) Development of Communications, Special Account, UNICEF, the UN

49) Development Program, and other sources of funding include national

50) governments and private donors.

51) **4) Recommends** that the distribution of funds be decided by the IPDC.

14. Preambulatory and operative clauses

PREAMBULATORY AND OPENING CLAUSES

Affirming	Expecting	Keeping in mind
Alarmed by	Expressing its appreciation	Noting further
Approving	Expressing its satisfaction	Noting with regret
Aware of	Fulfilling	Noting with satisfaction
Believing	Fully aware	Noting with deep concern
Bearing in mind	Fully alarmed	Noting further
Cognizant of	Fully believing	Noting with approval
Confident	Further developing	Observing
Contemplating	Further recalling	Realizing
Convinced	Guided by	Reaffirming
Declaring	Having adopted	Recalling
Deeply concerned	Having considered	Recognizing
Deeply conscious	Having considered further	Referring
Deeply convinced	Having devoted attention	Seeking
Deeply disturbed	Having examined	Taking into account
Deeply regretting	Having Heard	Taking note
Desiring	Having received	Viewing with appreciation
Emphasizing	Having studied	Welcoming

OPERATIVE CLAUSES

Accepts	Emphasizes	Proclaims
Affirms	Encourages	Reaffirms
Approves	Endorses	Recommends
Authorizes	Expresses its	Reminds
Calls for	appreciation	Regrets
Calls upon	Expresses its hope	Requests
Condemns	Further invites	Resolves
Congratulates	Further proclaims	Solemnly affirms
Confirms	Further reminds	Strongly condemns
Considers	Further recommends	Supports
Declares accordingly	Further requests	Takes note of
Deplores	Further resolves	Trusts
Draws attention	Has resolved	Urges
Designates	Notes	

15. Schedule of ULSACMUN 2026

Lunes 11		Martes 12		Miércoles 13	
7:00-7:50	Registro	7:00-7:50	Séptima sesión	7:00-8:20	Decimoquinta Sesión
7:50-8:30	Inauguración	7:55-8:45	Octava sesión		
8.30-9:40	Conferencia	8:50-9:40	Novena sesión	8:30-9:40	Panel de testimonios
9:40-10:10	Receso	9:40-10:10	Receso	9:40-10:10	Receso
10:10-11:00	Primera sesión	10:10-11:00	Décima sesión	10:10-11:00	Decimosexta sesión
11:05-11:55	Segunda sesión	11:05-11:55	Undécima sesión	11:05-11:55	Premiación en comités
11:55-12:15	Receso	11:55-12:15	Receso	11:55-12:15	Receso
12:15-13:05	Tercera sesión	12:15-13:05	Duodécima sesión	12:15-14:00	Premiación y clausura
13:05-14:00	Cuarta sesión	13:05-14:00	Decimotercera sesión		
14:00-16:00	Comida	14:00-16:00	Comida		
16:00-16:55	Quinta Sesión	16:00-16:55	Decimocuarta sesión		
16:55-17:10	Refrigerio	16:55-17:10	Refrigerio		
17:10-18:00	Sexta sesión	17:10-18:00	Presentación artística		